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INTRODUCTION
Insurance law and tort law are fraternal twins. Though not
identical, they reflect one another. They may even finish one another’s
sentences.
Regardless of the bells and whistles on an automobile, there will
be accidents. So long as automobiles have drivers responsible for
101
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controlling the wheel, the insurance scheme may look much as it does
at present. When the bells and whistles do not sound as they should,
however, an increasing amount of liability for injuries is likely to
bypass drivers and alight on the sellers and manufacturers of the
vehicle.1
Apart from other social benefits, there is every reason to assume
that autonomous vehicles (AVs) will be safer than current automobiles.
Among other features, they will enjoy a 360-degree field of vision,
they will have a faster reaction time, and they will not fall asleep.2
Assuming they are safer, in an efficient market the overall cost of
insuring AVs should decrease. To the extent the insurance burden is
ultimately shouldered by those other than the driver,3 it will be added
to the cost of the car. Although lower, the owner will still bear the cost
of the premium.4 The lower direct and indirect insurance cost should,
therefore, benefit consumers. It also should be more efficient for the
manufacturer to purchase one policy covering 10,000 automobiles than
for drivers to purchase 10,000 policies, each covering only one
automobile.
If we contemplate the futuristic world of the totally autonomous
vehicle—one in which the driver is simply a passenger free to read,
text,5 or even sleep—the dynamics of insuring a car may change
considerably.6 If a driver is merely a passenger, and if the driver’s

* Robert W. Peterson is a Professor of Law at Santa Clara University and Director for
the School of Law’s Center for Insurance Law and Regulation. The author is very grateful
to law student and research assistant, Nicole Hess, for her assistance with this Article.
1. See Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 417 (1978); Soule v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 8 Cal. 4th 548, 559 (1994).
2. See HANS-JOACHIM WUENSCHE ET AL., RESARCH FOR THE INSTITUTE FOR
AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY, available at http://www.elrob.org/fileadmin/
catalogue/9.pdf.
3. Although the car may “drive” itself, this Article will use “driver” as shorthand for
driver/owner/operator/passenger in charge.
4. Since auto insurance is mandatory in California, the premium is a cost of owning a
car. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 16020 (West 2007). Although products liability insurance is
not mandatory, manufacturers and suppliers will also pass their insurance costs through to
purchasers.
5. Nevada recently amended its vehicle code to permit texting while in a self-driving
vehicle. Senate Bill 104 amended Nevada Revised Statutes section 484B.165 to read:
For the purposes of this section [prohibiting texting and mobile phone use while
operating a motor vehicle], a person shall be deemed not to be operating a motor
vehicle if the motor vehicle is driven autonomously through the use of artificialintelligence software and the autonomous operation of the motor vehicle is
authorized by law.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 484B.165.
6. Popular culture has imagined autonomous cars for years, from Woody Allen’s 1973
movie “Sleeper,” to Stephen King’s 1986 movie “Maximum Overdrive,” where cars come
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responsibility is to remain fault-based, then what purpose would a
typical automobile liability policy serve?7 What relevance remains for
auto insurance? This Article will address this issue and propose ways
in which auto insurance might change to accommodate the use of AVs.
Part I briefly reviews the background of insurance regulation nationally
and in California. Part II discusses general insurance and liability
issues related to AVs. Part III discusses some challenges that insurers
and regulators may face when setting rates for AVs, both generally and
under California’s more idiosyncratic regulatory structure. Part IV
discusses challenges faced by California insurers who may want to
reduce rates in a timely way when technological improvements rapidly
reduce risk.
I.

CURRENT INSURANCE REGULATION

In 1945 Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act.8 This Act
largely ceded regulation of insurance to the states.9 With rare
exception, regulation of insurance has remained in the states.10 The
year following the enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) surveyed
existing state laws and proposed its model rating bills.11 These
included the provisions, now virtually standard in all states, that rates
not be excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.12 Rates could
be modified for individual risks only if based on “variations in hazards
or expense provision, or both.”13 California adopted the restriction on

to life and reign terror over a small town, to the popular animated children’s movies “Cars”
and “Cars 2.” SLEEPER (Universal Artist 1973); MAXIMUM OVERDRIVE (De Laurentiis
Entertainment Group 1986); CARS (Walt Disney Pictures 2006); Cars 2 (Walt Disney
Pictures 2011).
7. Celent, a research group, published a study suggesting the possible demise of
liability insurance. Donald Light, A Scenario: The End of Auto Insurance, CELENT (May 8,
2012), http://www.celent.com/reports/scenario-end-auto-insurance (includes an Abstract and
projected time line).
Of course, there will still be a need for collision, comprehensive, medical pay, and
perhaps underinsured motorist—although recovery under underinsured motorist coverage
requires proof of liability on the part of the underinsured motorist. See CAL. INS. CODE §
11580.2 (West 2006).
8. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2011).
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012.
10. ERISA and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act are exceptions. See
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47–49 (1987).
11. Michael J. Miller, Disparate Impact and Unfair Discriminatory Insurance Rates,
CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SOC’Y E-FORUM, Winter 2009, at 276, 279, http://www.
casact.org/pubs/forum/09wforum/miller.pdf.
12. Id. at 280.
13. Id.
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unfairly discriminatory rates in the 1947 McBride-Grunsky Act, and
the restriction that rates may not be “excessive, inadequate, or unfairly
discriminatory” was carried forward into Proposition 103.14
Virtually all insurance regulators include an assurance within their
brief that insurance companies remain solvent and pay their claims.
This is reflected by the word “inadequate” in the phrase “excessive,
inadequate or unfairly discriminatory.”15 A second goal, consumer
protection, will be reflected in statutes and regulations directed at, for
example, claims and marketing practices. Depending on how market
oriented the state may be, consumer protection is also reflected by the
fact that states regulate rates with the purpose to keep them as low as
practical. States differ greatly with respect to their approach to
accomplishing this latter goal.16
Focusing on automobile insurance, most states divide into three
broad categories of regulation: prior approval, file-and-use, and useand-file.
File-and-use or use-and-file states rely primarily on
competition to determine insurance rates.17 Insurers may simply file
their rates with their Insurance Commissioner and use them (sometimes
after a fairly short waiting period), or use them immediately as long as
they file the rates within a specified period of time.18 Although
commissioners in these states have broad oversight and can disapprove
a rate based on inadequacy, excessiveness, or unfair discrimination,
they tend primarily to rely on the marketplace to regulate rates.19
There is a substantial amount of data about automobile loss
experiences on which insurers and regulators base their rates. All
automobile owners are familiar with the practice of adjusting auto rates
up or down based on various factors relevant to risk. Common factors
relevant to risk include driving record, miles driven, years licensed,
education, marital status, gender, location, type of car, years of
coverage by the company, academics, number of cars and drivers, etc.20
14. See MacKay v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1427,1445 (Ct. App. 2010); CAL.
INS. CODE § 1861.05(a) (West 2011).
15. Id. § 1861.05(a).
16. See Vanessa Wells, Ships Passing in the Night: How California’s Statutory
Framework Directs Traffic Through the Maze of Jurisdictional Doctrines Concerning
Insurance Rates, 44 U.S.F. L. Rev. 853 (2010).
17. J. ROBERT HUNTER, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, STATE AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE REGULATION: A NATIONAL QUALITY ASSESSMENT AND IN-DEPTH REVIEW OF
CALIFORNIA’S UNIQUELY EFFECTIVE REGULATORY SYSTEM 2–3 (2008), available at
http://www.consumerfed.org.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. See Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Found. v. Low, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1179, 1187 (Ct.
App. 2000); HUNTER, supra note 17, at 36–39.
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When working within the context of a file-and-use or use-and-file
environment, AVs will present only modest challenges to an insurer
that wants to write these policies. The main challenge will arise from
the fact that the policy must be rated for a new technology that may
have an inadequate base of experience for an actuary to estimate future
losses.21
“Prior approval” states, like California, require that automobile
rates be approved prior to their use in the marketplace.22 These states
rely more on regulation than on competition to modulate insurance
rates.23 In California, automobile insurance rates are approved in a
two-step process. The first step is the creation of a “rate plan.”24 The
rate plan considers the insurer’s entire book of business in the relative
line of insurance and asks the question: How much total premium must
the insurer collect in order to cover the projected risks, overhead and
permitted profit for that line?25 The insurer then creates a “class plan.”
The class plan asks the question: How should different policyholders’
premiums be adjusted up or down based on the risks presented by
different groups or classes of policyholders?26 Among other factors,
the Department of Insurance requires that the rating factors comply
with California law and be justified by the loss experience for the
group.27
Rating a new technology with an unproven track record may
include a considerable amount of guesswork. Of course, those
marketing AVs will have subjected the vehicles to rigorous testing in
an environment, one may assume, congruent with those the auto is
likely to encounter. These test results, if shared with insurance
companies, would give some basis for rating the automobile.
Nevertheless, insurers may over or underestimate the frequency and
severity of future accidents. The rate may be excessive, or it may be
inadequate. Since one might expect that there will be few AVs
initially, an inadequate rate may not implicate serious solvency issues
for an insurer that has a large book of traditional automobile insurance.
A rate that turns out to be excessive may be “unfairly discriminatory,”
21. See Rodney Griffin, New Technologies Rapidly Changing Auto Insurance Business,
PROPERTY CASUALTY 360° (Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/
2011/02/10/new-technologies-rapidly-changing-auto-insurance-b.
22. Wells, supra note 16, at 853.
23. See HUNTER, supra note 17.
24. See MacKay v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1427, 1431 (Ct. App. 2010).
25. See id. at 1436.
26. See Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Found. v. Low, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1179, 1201 (Ct.
App. 2000).
27. See id. at 1201–04.
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but the practicalities of making a more accurate estimate based on little
or no experience would likely prove a defense to any discrimination
claim.
A. Some Insurance Issues Unique to California
California is the largest insurance market in the United States, and
it is the sixth largest among the countries of the world.28 Cars are
culture in this most populous state. There are far more insured
automobiles in California than any other state.29 The California
Department of Insurance employs between 1200 and 1300 employees,
including over eighty lawyers.30
It works with a budget of
approximately $150 million.31
Automobile insurance in California is governed by Proposition
103, adopted by the voters in 1988.32 Proposition 103 has a history
which may be instructive in understanding some of the challenges to
implementing AV coverage in California.
1.

Political History of Proposition 103

The historian Edward Gibbon often noted that the fate of nations
frequently turned on the “chance of arms.”33 The phrase reflects that
battles often have unpredictable outcomes. One may think of
Proposition 103 as the last soldier still standing after the “Tort Wars”
of the late 1980’s.34
28. Analysis of 2006–07 Budget Bill, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE,
http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_2006/general_govt/gen_05_0845_anl06.html (last visited
Apr. 23, 2012).
29. Auto Insurance, INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.iii.org/
media/facts/statsbyissue/auto/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2012).
30. Center for Insurance Law and Regulation, SANTA CLARA LAW,
http://law.scu.edu/insurancelaw/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2012).
31. Marc Lifsher, California Insurance Commissioner to Gain More Power from
Federal Healthcare Law, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/
2010/oct/14/business/la-fi-insurance-commissioner-20101014.
32. MacKay v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1427, 1440 (Ct. App. 2010). The
sections of Proposition 103 are found in CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1861.01–1861.14 (West 2011).
33. EDWARD GIBBON, THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN
EMPIRE 399 (1831).
34. See Wells, supra note 16; Stephen D. Sugarman, California’s Insurance Regulation
Revolution: The First Two Years of Proposition 103, 27 San Diego L. Rev. 683, 683–86
(2010); Regulation Modernization, INS. INFO. INST., http://www.iii.org/issue_updates/
Regulation-Modernization.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2012). Every decade seems to have its
“Tort Wars.” See, e.g., Dan Walters, Tort Wars are Being Revived, MOSCOW-PULLMAN
DAILY NEWS, December 13, 1996, at 8B, available at http://news.google.com/newspapers?
nid=2026&dat=19961213&id=T1996121BAJ&sj8qAAAAIBAJ&sjid=i9AFAAAAIBAJ&p
g=4443,1187484. The battles of the 1980’s, however, are most relevant to the insurance
issues presented by AVs.
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In a 1986 skirmish, insurance and defense interests were
successful in persuading voters to adopt Proposition 51.35 Proposition
51 limited defendants’ responsibility for non-economic harm to each
defendant’s share of relative fault.36 This victory emboldened the
defense side and galvanized the opposition of those representing
claimants’ interests.37 Each drew its battle lines with proposed
legislation and further propositions.
Representatives of some of the warring parties agreed to parle at
Frank Fat’s restaurant in Sacramento. With then Speaker of the House,
Willie Brown, shuttling among the belligerents’ tables, the parties
outlined a treaty on a Napkin.38 This has become known as the
“Napkin Deal,” and a copy occupies a place of honor in the lobby of
Frank Fat’s.39 It was too much to hope for “piece in our time,” but the
belligerents did agree to some modest legislative reforms and a fiveyear armistice in which they would cease seeking tort reform in either
the legislature or by initiative.40
The agreement included a
disarmament provision in which the parties entered into contracts with
the main petition signature gathering businesses in California in order
to make it difficult for them to work for either side during the
armistice.41
The legislative portion of the Napkin Deal passed through the
committees of both houses, was adopted by both houses, and was
signed by the Governor within three days of the famous meal at Frank
Fat’s.42 This seemed like unseemly haste to many stakeholders who
believed they had been either left out of the negotiations or had been
poorly represented in the process.43 Consequently, an insurgency
formed among those who did not accept that they were bound by the
Napkin Deal.44
Thus, in 1988 the parties again cast their lot to the chance of arms.
This year saw five ballot initiatives directed towards tort reform or
35. See Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1192 (1988).
36. See id.; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West 2011).
37. See Sugarman, supra note 34.
38. See Rodney R. Moy, Tobacco Companies, Immune No More—California’s
Removal of the Legal Barriers Preventing Plaintiffs from Recovering for Tobacco-Related
Illness, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 761, 770 (1998).
39. Id.
40. Id.; Richard L. Abel, Questioning the Counter-Majoritarian Thesis: The Case of
Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 533, 543 (1999).
41. See JAMES RICHARDSON, WILLIE BROWN: A BIOGRAPHY 348–49 (1996).
42. See id.
43. See id. at 350–51.
44. Id. (“[T]he narrowness of the participation in the napkin deal brought a narrow
result. Consumer groups vowed to get even.”).
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insurance. Several were cunningly designed so that, if they passed and
received more votes than a rival proposition that also passed, the one
with the greater number of votes would supplant the rival. When the
cannon thunder ceased and the smoke of battle cleared, Proposition 103
was the only proposition to pass.
Proposition 103 radically changed insurance law and regulation in
California. Among other things, it changed California from a freemarket state to a state in which most rates charged by insurers are set
by regulation.45 Even though Proposition 103 promised voters a 20%
roll back in their rates, it nevertheless passed by a slim margin46—less
than 51%.47 The voters never received their anticipated 20% roll
back—that portion of the Proposition was declared unconstitutional.48
The California Supreme Court ruled that it was “confiscatory” and held
that insurers are entitled to a “fair and reasonable” return on their
investment.49
Invalidating the 20% roll back removed a major incentive for
voters to support the Proposition. Despite the slim margin of victory,
the Court nevertheless upheld the Proposition’s severability clause and
also upheld most of the Proposition’s remaining provisions.50 These
changes included:
• Moving California from a state in which rates are regulated by
the market place to a state in which most rates must receive
51
prior approval (a “prior approval” state in insurance parlance).
• Changing the office of Commissioner of Insurance from an
52
appointed office to an elected office.

45. See 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, 8 Cal. 4th 216, 299–300 (1994).
46. See CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.01 (West 2011).
47. See Should State Regulate Health Insurance Premiums?, CAL. HEALTHLINE (Jun.
20, 2011), http://www.californiahealthline.org/think-tank/2011/should-state-regulate-healthinsurance-premiums.aspx.
48. Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805, 832 (1989).
49. Id. at 819. Based on Article II, section 12 of the California Constitution: statutes
may not identify “any private corporation to perform any function . . . .” Id. The court also
struck down the portion of Proposition 103 that created a consumer-advocacy corporation.).
CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.10(c) (West 2011).
50. Calfarm Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 3d at 821–22, 839–41. (“[I]t seems eminently reasonable
to suppose that those who favor the proposition would be happy to achieve at least some
substantial portion of their purpose.”). Given the allure and heavy promotion of the twenty
percent role back, one may legitimately wonder whether the voters understood the crosssubsidies and other consequences of Proposition 103. Compare Nevada where their
equivalent of Proposition 103 was struck down in its entirety. See Guaranty Nat’l Ins. Co. v.
Gates, 916 F.2d 508, 512–15 (9th Cir. 1990).
51. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.05(b).
52. Id. § 12900(a) (West 2006).
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• Forbidding the charging of any rate unless the insurer files a
53
complete rate application with the commissioner.
• Mandating a “Good-Driver” discount of at least twenty percent
(a discount, as explained later, that turns largely on traffic
54
convictions and/or “principally at-fault accidents”).
• Requiring that the top three rating factors for auto insurance
must be, in descending order of importance: (1) insured’s
driving safety record, (2) miles driven annually, and (3) years of
55
driving experience.

Whether prior approval or one of the more open-competition
based systems saves consumers money may be fairly debated.
Proposition 103 did little to address the major costs that drive
automobile insurance rates—the costs of adjusting, defending and
paying claims. Some restrictions extend to executive compensation (at
least to the extent that it can be counted as a legitimate cost in rate
making),56 efficiency standards for the costs of reasonably efficient
insurers,57 permitted rates of return, 58 and maximum and minimum
permitted earned premium.59
One can argue that these are merely the icing on the cake. The
“cake” is the cost of the product being sold—defending and paying
claims. Major cost containment developments in this arena all
occurred outside the purview of Proposition 103. For example,
Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos.60 eliminated third-party bad
faith claims; Thing v. La Chusa61 narrowed the circle of parties who
may recover for negligently caused emotional damages; State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell62 restricted the amount
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. § 1861.05(b) (West 2011).
Id. §§ 1861.02(b), 1861.025.
Id. § 1861.05(a).
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2644.10 (2008) (excluded expenses).
Id. tit. 10, § 2644.12 (efficiency standard).
Id. tit. 10, §§ 2644.15–2644.16.
Id. tit. 10, §§ 2644.2–2644.3.
Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 304 (1988).
Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 647 (1989).
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416–417 (2003); see
JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LITIGATION ROAD: THE STORY OF CAMPBELL V. STATE FARM
(2008). Bad faith judgments, one major source of punitive damages, may not be counted as
an expense for ratemaking purposes. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2644.10(c). Punitive
damages are sometimes not covered either because directly or indirectly excluded by the
policy language, or because of public policy. See Tom Baker, Reconsidering Insuance for
Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 101 (1998); PPG Indus. Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co,
20 Cal. 4th 310, 318–19 (1999) (no coverage for punitive damages). Insurers may,
nevertheless, be obliged to defend a claim which includes punitive damages. Ohio Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Hubbard, 162 Cal. App. 3d 939, 946 (Ct. App. 1984).
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of punitive damages that may be awarded for torts; Howell v. Hamilton
Meats & Provisions, Inc.63 greatly reduced the amount recoverable
under the collateral source rule when medical bills are covered by
health insurance; Cal. Civ. Code section 3333.4 eliminated pain and
suffering claims for injured drunk or uninsured drivers; Truman v.
Vargas64 established that failure to wear a seat belt is contributory
negligence; and Cal. Civil Code section 1431.2 (Proposition 51)
limited liability for noneconomic damages (i.e., pain and suffering) to
each defendant’s portion of fault.65 In addition, automobiles are safer
today than in the past, and the number of fatalities per miles driven is
steadily dropping.66 Insurers also have developed more sophisticated
ways to streamline and reduce the costs of automobile repairs by, for
example, adopting arrangements with automobile repair facilities.67
All of these changes in tort law, automobile design, and automobile
repair took palpable slices out of the cake and reduce the overall cost of
insuring drivers.
Although adopted by the barest majority, Proposition 103 may be
amended by the legislature only by a two-thirds vote, and then only if
the legislation “further[s] [the] purposes” of Proposition 103.68 Thus,
Proposition 103 and the regulations adopted by the Department of
Insurance are the matrix in which most (but not all) insurance is sold
and regulated in California.69

63. Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 52 Cal. 4th 541, 548 (2011). There
is currently a bill before the California legislature to modify the Howell decision. S.B. 1528,
2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
64. Truman v. Vargas, 275 Cal. App. 2d 976, 983–84 (Ct. App. 1969).
65. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2(a) (West 1988); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(a)–
(b) (West 1988) (limiting pain and suffering in medical malpractice cases to $250,000). The
$250,000 cap, which was adopted in 1975, was not indexed for inflation. In 2010 dollars the
cap is worth only about $58,112. Today it would cost about $1,001,569 to purchase what
could be purchased for $250,000 in 1975. S. Morgan Friedman, THE INFLATION
CALCULATOR, http://www.westegg.com/inflation/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2012).
66. See Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Traffic Safety Performance (Core
Outcomes) Measures for California, http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/departments/nrd30/ncsa/STSI/6_CA/2008/6_CA_2008.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2012).
67. See Cal. Ins. Code § 758.5 (West 1988) (insurer may not require insured to use a
particular auto repair facility, but insurer may truthfully explain the benefits of using the
automobile repair facility with which the insurer has a relationship).
68. See Found. for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights v. Garamendi, 132 Cal. App. 4th
1354, 1365–66 (Ct. App. 2005) (invalidating legislation that did not, in the court’s view,
further the purposes of Proposition 103).
69. For example, health insurance rates are not regulated in California. There is
currently a bill before the California Legislature, A.B. 52 2010–2011 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010),
and possibly a ballot initiative for the November 2012 ballot aimed at requiring approval of
health insurance rates.
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II. INSURANCE ISSUES AND AVS
A. Liability Coverage in the Standard Automobile Insurance Contract
The standard automobile insurance contract contains a bundle of
coverages. Some are “first-party” coverages. These coverages give a
claim directly against the policyholder’s insurer.70 Among these are:
comprehensive (covering such things a falling trees, collisions with
animals, etc.), collision (covering the policyholder’s automobile for
damage to it from other accidents whether or not there is fault on the
part of any party), medical payments coverage (“MedPay”—covering
medical expenses up to a usually fairly modest limit), and
uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM”) (covering, up to a limit, the
insured person, family member, or person occupying the covered
automobile for their damages, including bodily injury and pain and
suffering, if they are legally entitled to recover them from the owner or
operator of an uninsured/underinsured motor vehicle). There may also
be some other modest coverages, such as reimbursement for towing
and rental.
To the extent these coverages are triggered against one’s own
insurance company without the need of a finding of fault on the part of
anyone, they may not present interesting or unique challenges in a
world of AVs. Presumably, owners of AVs will continue to want
comprehensive, collision, MedPay, and UM coverage for their
vehicles, and presumably insurers will continue to see a business
opportunity in writing the coverages.
The question becomes more perplexing, however, when “liability”
is required to trigger coverage. Liability almost always turns on some
level of fault. While it is common to speak of an automobile as
“covered,” in reality the liability coverage under the policy only
extends to a constellation of people or entities who bear some
relationship to the automobile or the insured (e.g., the owner, the
insured, the insured’s family, or a permissive driver of the car).
Typical language may provide words to the effect that the insurer will
pay damages for bodily injury or property damage for which any
covered person becomes legally responsible because of an auto
accident.71 The policy will also provide that the insurer will defend
70. See Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 48 Cal. 3d 395, 399 n.2 (1989) (“[I]f the
insured is seeking coverage against loss or damage sustained by the insured, the claim is
first party in nature. If the insured is seeking coverage against liability of the insured to
another, the claim is third party in nature.”).
71. See, e.g., United Serv. Auto. Assn. v. Lilly, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1396, 1399 (Ct. App.
1990) (emphasis added).
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and, if it thinks appropriate, settle any such claim. Similarly, UM
coverage is triggered only when the policyholder is “legally entitled” to
recover from the other motorist. In both cases, the coverage attaches
only when either the covered person or the owner or operator of the
UM vehicle is at fault. Fault usually requires negligence, and in the
context of automobiles, negligence usually flows from the violation of
one of the many rules of the road.72
If the owner properly maintains an AV and the vehicle drives
itself, there is a serious question whether the innocent “driver” (if that
is even a proper description of the person’s role) is “legally”
responsible. The coverage may not be triggered because no one is
either “legally responsible” or “legally entitled.”
The State of Nevada recently adopted regulations for licensing the
testing of AVs in the state. The regulations would require insurance in
the minimum amounts required for other cars “for the payment of tort
liabilities arising from the maintenance or use of the motor vehicle.”73
The regulation, however, does not suggest how the tort liability may
arise. If there is no fault on the part of the operator or owner, then
liability may arise, if at all, only for the manufacturer or supplier.
Manufacturers and suppliers are not “insureds” under the standard
72. CAL. EVID. CODE § 669(b) creates a rebuttable presumption that violation of a
statute, ordinance or regulation is a failure to exercise due care. CAL. EVID. CODE § 669(b)
(West 1988). There are exceptions. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 40831 (West 2007) (“In
any civil action proof of speed in excess of any prima facie limit declared in Section 22352
at a particular time and place does not establish negligence as a matter of law but in all such
actions it shall be necessary to establish as a fact that the operation of a vehicle at the excess
speed constituted negligence.”) (emphasis added).
73. NEV. ADMIN. CODE. § 482.2(2) (2011). Any licensee who wishes to operate for
testing purposes an autonomous vehicle on any of the Nevada highways must continuously
maintain and:
a. Provide proof of liability insurance that is equal to or greater than the minimum
liability requirements for the State of Nevada:
1. In the amount of $15,000 for bodily injury to or death of one
person in any one accident;
2. Subject to the limit for one person, in the amount of $30,000 for
bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one
accident; and
3. In the amount of $10,000 for injury to or destruction of property of others
in any one accident, for the payment of tort liabilities arising from the
maintenance or use of the motor vehicle.
4. An operator’s policy will not be accepted by the Department as proof of
financial responsibility for an autonomous vehicle.
Id. A.B. 511, 76th Leg. Sess. (Nev. 2011) revised Nevada Revised Statutes, Ch. 483, to
require the Nevada Department of Transportation to “[s]et forth requirements for the
insurance that is required to test or operate an autonomous vehicle on a highway within this
State.” NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.100(b) (2011). The statute, however, does not address
policy content or related tort issues.
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automobile policy—at least so far. Thus, for the reasons stated above,
owners, manufacturers and suppliers may fall outside the coverage of
the policy.
Although the Nevada regulations do not clearly address the rules
governing tort liability, the regulations will make it much easier to
resolve issues surrounding the cause of accidents. AVs licensed under
the proposed regulations must save the data for at least thirty seconds
prior to any collision.74 This feature should also reduce the costs of
resolving factual disputes.
At this writing, Bills addressing AVs are pending in other states,
including Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii and Oklahoma.75
Doubtless many more will follow.
B. Possible Insurance Frameworks for AVs
Looking into this crystal ball, there are several considerations that
will weigh in favor of a continuing role for automobile insurance.
However safer AVs may be, they will still be dangerous and will spin
off injuries. The present public policy that requires auto insurance, or
proof of sufficient assets to respond to damages at some level, will not
change.76 Because of the comprehensive adoption of rules of the road,
it is rare for an accident to occur where one or more drivers, who all
must carry insurance, is not at fault.77 If there is no one at fault in a
collision involving a fully autonomous vehicle, how are injured
members of the public to be protected?

74. AVs must have:
[A] separate mechanism, in addition to, and separate from, any other mechanism
required by law, to capture and store the autonomous technology sensor data for at
least thirty seconds before a collision occurs between the autonomous vehicle and
another vehicle, object or natural person while the vehicle is operating in
autonomous mode. The autonomous technology sensor data must be captured and
stored in a read-only format by the mechanism so that the data is retained until
extracted from the mechanism by an external device capable of downloading and
storing the data. Such data must be preserved for 2 years after the date of the
collision.
REV. STAT. § 482A.8(2)(b).
75. H.B. 2679, 47th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2005); S.B. 1298 2011–2012 Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2012); C.S./H.B. 1207, 2012 Leg. (Fla. 2012); H.B. 2238 26th Leg. (Haw. 2012); H.B.
3007 2nd Sess. 53d Leg. (Okla. 2012). A web site that tracks legislative developments with
respect to autonomous vehicles is Automated Driving: Legislative and Regulatory Action,
THE CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC., http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/wiki/index.php/
Automated_Driving:_Legislative_and_Regulatory_Action (last visited Apr. 23, 2012).
76. CAL. VEH. CODE § 16020 (West 2007).
77. Id. Collisions with pedestrians and other objects may or may not implicate fault on
the part of a driver. E.g., Leo v. Dunham, 41 Cal. 2d 712, 714 (1953) (holding that driver
who struck pedestrian was not negligent as a matter of law).
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Products Liability

One possible approach would be to invoke the various doctrines of
products liability law. This would attach the major liability to sellers
and manufacturers of the vehicle. However, it is doubtful that this is an
acceptable approach for several reasons. For example, while some
accidents are catastrophic, fortunately most accidents cause only
modest damages. By contrast, products liability lawsuits tend to be
complex and expensive. Indeed, they may require the translation of
hundreds or thousands of engineering documents—perhaps written in
Japanese, Chinese or Korean.78
The standards for establishing a design defect are vague and
unpredictable. In California, a design defect may be established by
either (1) showing the product “failed to perform as safely as an
ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or
reasonably foreseeable manner,”79 or (2) showing, “through hindsight”
the product’s design embodies “excessive preventable danger.”80 If an
injured party can make a preliminary showing that the injury was
proximately caused by the “design” of the product, then the burden of
proof shifts to the supplier or manufacturer to show that the product
was not defective.81 When dealing with a sophisticated product, the
consumer expectation test may be difficult to apply.82 The standard for
establishing a manufacturing defect may be equally vague and very
expensive to prove.83 Moreover, cars are designed to last, but
innovative companies may or may not exist at the time of an
accident—even General Motors narrowly avoided oblivion.84

78. See In re Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, 687 F.2d 501, 505 (1st Cir. 1982)
(stating each party to bear translation costs of documents requested by it but cost possibly
taxable to prevailing party). Translation costs of Japanese documents in range of $250,000,
and translation costs of additional Spanish documents may exceed that amount. Id.
79. Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432 (1978).
80. Id. at 430.
81. “[W]e conclude that once the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the injury
was proximately caused by the product's design, the burden should appropriately shift to the
defendant to prove, in light of the relevant factors, that the product is not defective.” Id. at
431.
82. Soule v. General Motors Co., 8 Cal. 4th 548, 569–70 (1994) (consumer expectation
test inapplicable to crashworthiness of design because ordinary consumer would have no
idea how it should perform in crash). One could see courts accepting similar arguments
with respect to sophisticated computer systems.
83. For example, was there a “bug” in the program? Were “bugs” expected in
innovative technology?
84. See Nick Bunkley, G.M. Drops Application for Federal Energy Loan, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/business/28auto.html?_r=1&ref=
autoindustry.
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Insurance Coverage after Acquisitions

Assuming much of the liability (and insurance) burden were to
switch to manufacturers or suppliers, difficult insurance issues may
arise when innovative companies enter the market, leave the market, or
are acquired by others. Most policies insuring product risks are
“occurrence” policies. Claims arising during the policy period,
whether known or unknown, are covered. These policies typically
contain a clause forbidding assignment without the consent of the
insurer.85 This clause protects the insurer from additional, unbargained for risks the new enterprise may present.
An acquiring entity, either by operation of law or by contractual
assumption of liability, may be responsible for injuries caused by the
predecessor’s product. While coverage of claims occurring after an
acquisition would be governed by the restriction on assignment, what
coverage exists for pre-acquisition occurrences? One may argue that
the bargained for risk, the “occurrence,” has already attached, thus
there is no enhanced risk to the insurer by permitting assignment of the
coverage to the successor entity.
The leading Ninth Circuit case, Northern Insurance Co. v. Allied
Mutual Insurance Co.86 so held (at least as to liability imposed as a
matter of law from the sale of the predecessor’s assets). Regardless of
the characteristics of the successor, “the insurer still covers only the
risk it had evaluated when it wrote the policy.”87
Unfortunately, the issue is no longer so straightforward. In a later
asset acquisition case, in which the acquiring party assumed all
liabilities by contract, the California Supreme Court rejected the
argument that the benefits of the policy can be assigned with respect to
a pre-acquisition occurrence that has not been “reduced to a sum of
money due or to become due under the policy.”88 Such an inchoate
claim does not rise to the level of an assignable “chose in action” under
California law.89 Additionally, the insurer’s risk may be increased
because the insurer’s duty to defend may now extend to two entities
(the transferor and the transferee), rather than to the one entity that was

85. A typical clause may read: “Assignment of interest under this policy shall not bind
the [insurer] until its consent is endorsed hereon.” Kenneth C. Newa, Corporate Successor
Liability: Insurer’s Perspective, 41 BRIEF 60 (2011).
86. N. Ins. Co. of New York v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 955 F.2d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir.
1992).
87. Id. at 1358.
88. Henkel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 29 Cal. 4th 934, 945 (2007).
89. Id. at 944.
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the insured under the original bargain.90 The Court left open the
question of whether coverage rights would have existed had the
liability arisen as a matter of law. Other courts have adopted slightly
more nuanced positions. 91
If the product seller is extant and has sufficient assets, the vagaries
of coverage are largely a headache for the company rather than the
injured party. Since coverage follows the company, not the vehicle,
when the company no longer exists or is undercapitalized these issues
will add an additional layer of uncertainty for parties injured by AVs.
Placing the insurance burden solely on the manufacturer or
supplier also presents issues of adverse selection and moral hazard
discussed below. Public policy would, therefore, strongly suggest that
there should be a party both financially responsible and reasonably
accessible. Assuming public entities are not willing to assume the
insurance burden, there are several possible approaches that bear strong
analogies to current law.
Even if products liability concepts were to dominate this area,
there still may be some role for fault-based liability on the part of AV
owners. Like automobile tires and brakes, owners have a responsibility
for maintenance and have a responsibility to respond if the automobile
shows signs that it is acting in an untoward way. Once an owner is or
should be aware that the automobile is not acting as it should, the
owner may be negligent in continuing to drive the car until the issue is
adequately addressed.92 Owners would likely want to insure against
this possible liability.
3.

Strict Liability When an AV is “At Fault”

Present law in California makes the owner of a vehicle
responsible, up to the minimum required coverage for liability
90. Id. at 944–45.
91. In Pilkington North America v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co., the policy was
assignable because “a chose in action arises under an occurrence-based policy at the time of
the covered loss.” Pilkington N. Am. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 861 N.E.2d 121, 129
(Ohio 2006). The court left open the transferability of the right to a defense. Id. at 129. By
contrast, the court in Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. v. U.S. Filter Corp., held the rights
assignable only if at the moment of assignment “the policyholder could have brought its
own action against the insurer for coverage . . . . [A]t a minimum the losses must have been
reported to give rise to the chose in action.” Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. U.S. Filter Corp.,
895 N.E.2d 1172, 1180 (Ind. 2008). Other cases collected and suggestions on how to
structure acquisitions are included in Newa, supra note 85; Joseph Thacker et al., Do Rights
Transfer Under Occurrence-Based General Liability Insurance Policies After the Sale of a
Business?, 41 BRIEF 52 (2011).
92. Fremont Comp. Ins. Co. v. Hartnett, 19 Cal. App. 4th 669, 675–77 (Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that defendant’s failure to maintain brakes raised a presumption of negligence).
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insurance, for accidents caused by the fault of any permissive user of
the automobile.93 Thus, when the actual driver is at fault, the owner is
liable without fault for the driver’s actions.94 Perhaps the next step
might be to make the owner liable when the owner’s automobile is “at
fault” in the sense that it violates one of the many rules of the road that
would have imposed liability on a human driver. If tort law were to
take this step, owners would want this liability insured.
Owner liability for permissive drivers, at least as presently
constructed, is capped at a very modest amount.95 Under the current
liability regime, drivers, however, must respond for all the damages for
which they are responsible. Assuming drivers have or may have assets,
they are motivated to insure well beyond these modest limits. Thus,
under the present structure, injured parties often have available assets
well beyond the minimum limits.96 Policymakers, such as legislatures,
will have to decide whether strict liability, perhaps with a cap in the
absence of fault, is an acceptable response for parties injured by AVs.
Another small step, which may require legislation, might involve
accepting an analogy to agency law. An autonomous automobile is
very much like a driver hired by the owner. It is doing the owner’s
bidding, and if the car violates the rules of the road and causes an
injury, perhaps the owner or the one instructing the automobile should
be liable as they would be for a similar injury caused by the conduct of
an agent.97 Name the car “Jeeves,” and the step may be easier to
accept.98
Courts and legislatures have been somewhat ambivalent about this
approach. While imposing limited owner liability by statute for the
fault of a permissive user, at the same time the courts (at least in
California) long ago abandoned the “Family Purpose Doctrine”—a

93. CAL. VEH. CODE § 17150 (West 2007).
94. See Wildman v. Gov’t Emp. Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 31, 39–40 (1957).
95. See CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.1 (West 1988); CAL. VEH. CODE § 17151(a) (West
2007).
96. See id.
97. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2295 (West 2011) (defining “agent”). This would be similar to
the doctrine of respondeat superior where an employer is liable for the acts of his employee
so long as the acts are within the scope of employment. Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, 41
Cal. 3d 962, 967 (1986); Tyson v. Romey, 88 Cal. App. 2d 752, 755 (Ct. App. 1948); see
Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability, 69
S. CAL. L. REV. 1739 (1996).
98. See the many humorous stories by P.G. Wodehouse about Bertie Wooster and his
clever butler, Jeeves. E.g., Carry on Jeeves, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Carry_on,_Jeeves. The adventures of the sagacious valet were presented in the 1990s
British sitcom “Jeeves and Wooster.” Jeeves and Wooster (ITV television broadcast 1990–
93).
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doctrine which, when applicable, made any driver of the car for a
family purpose the agent of the owner.99 In another example of
ambivalence, California rejected the liability of a driver for nonnegligent brake failure, but held the driver could be liable for the
negligence of the mechanic who had serviced the brakes.100 Although
liability of the driver required fault on the part of someone (the
automobile mechanic), the duty to maintain the brakes in a nonnegligent manner was a “nondelegable duty.”101 The Court was
persuaded, in part, because the Vehicle Code at the time provided that
every motor vehicle “shall be equipped with brakes adequate to control
the movement of the vehicle and to stop and hold the vehicle.”102 The
Vehicle Code also provided that all “[b]rakes and component parts
thereof shall be maintained . . . in good working order.”103 There is
99. Johnson v. Peterson, 38 Cal. App. 3d 619, 624, 624 n.4 (Ct. App. 1974). The
doctrine is still applied in some states. See Nelson v. Johnson, 599 N.W.2d 246, 248 (N.D.
1999) (“The respondeat superior theoretical basis for the doctrine is a fiction created in
furtherance of the public policy of giving an injured party a cause of action against a
financially responsible defendant.”).
100. Maloney v. Rath, 69 Cal. 2d 442, 448 (1968). In the context of workplace injuries
to employees of independent contractors hired by the defendant, the nondelegable duty
doctrine has had a tortured history in California. See SeaBright Ins. v. U.S. Airways, 52
Cal. 4th 590, 601–03 (2011).
101.
Unlike strict liability, a nondelegable duty operates, not as a substitute for liability
based on negligence, but to assure that when a negligently caused harm occurs, the
injured party will be compensated by the person whose activity caused the harm
and who may therefore properly be held liable for the negligence of his agent,
whether his agent was an employee or an independent contractor. To the extent
that recognition of nondelegable duties tends to insure that there will be a
financially responsible defendant available to compensate for the negligent harms
caused by that defendant's activity, it ameliorates the need for strict liability to
secure compensation.
Maloney, 60 Cal. 2d at 446 n.32. The court noted that “[h]e is the party primarily to be
benefited by its use; he selects the contractor and is free to insist upon one who is financially
responsible and to demand indemnity from him; the cost of his liability insurance that
distributes the risk is properly attributable to his activities.” Id. at 448 (emphasis added).
102. Maloney, 60 Cal. 2d at 444.
103. Id. at 444. Proposed AV regulations in Nevada may possibly be read as endorsing
strict liability when an AV violates a rule of the road. NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 484.1(a)(3)
provides:
A vehicle with autonomous technology shall comply with the statutes and
regulations applicable to operation of a vehicle on a highway:
a. Compliance with the statutes and regulations applicable to operation of a
vehicle on a highway may be achieved with or without a driver
depending on the capabilities of the vehicle’s autonomous technology;
and
b. If a driver is necessary due to limitations of the autonomous technology,
the limitations must be defined in the autonomous technology’s owner's
manual; and
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little difference between a defect that causes the vehicle to fail to brake
and a defect that causes the brakes to fail. Again, if legislatures, courts,
or regulators were to endorse either the agency or nondelegable duty
approach in order to give injured parties protection similar to what they
now enjoy (an accessible, legally and financially responsible party),
automobile owners would need to insure against the risk.
Regardless of what liability scheme is adopted, if there is any
chance of suits against owners, they will want insurance for the
purpose of tendering their defense, indemnifying losses, or adjusting
losses, whether or not suits are filed. Auto manufactures that do not
have a network of insurance adjusters may be ill-suited to deal with the
daily grist of auto accidents.
If a design or manufacturing defect in an AV substantially
contributed to an accident, an insurer that insured and indemnified the
car owner would be free to pursue a claim against the manufacturer.104
Likewise, an injured party could similarly pursue a products liability
claim should the insurance coverage prove inadequate.105 Claims
exceeding the coverage are more likely to be large enough to justify the
expense.
4.

First-Party Insurance

To the extent that liability of the owner or driver diminishes or
disappears altogether, injured parties may prefer to look towards firstparty, rather than third party insurance, to make them as whole as
c.

If a driver is not necessary, the autonomous technology shall be granted
all of the rights and shall be subject to all of the duties applicable to the
driver of a vehicle, except those provisions which by their nature can
have no application.
NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 484.1(a)(3) (2011) (emphasis added). A more recent proposed
regulation (December 27, 2011), NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.3 provides: “[A] person
shall be deemed the operator of an autonomous vehicle which is operated in
autonomous mode when the person causes the autonomous vehicle to engage,
regardless of whether the person is physically present in the vehicle while it is
engaged.” Id. (emphasis added).
Section (4)(2) provides that:
For the purpose of enforcing the traffic laws and other laws applicable to drivers
and motor vehicles operated in this State, the operator of an autonomous vehicle
that is operated in autonomous mode shall be deemed the driver of the
autonomous vehicle regardless of whether the person is physically present in the
autonomous vehicle while it is engaged.
ADMIN. § 482A.4(2). It is not clear whether this regulation would impose a nondelegable
tort duty on the “vehicle” or on the “autonomous technology,” or on the “operator” or
“driver,” nor is it clear how it would do so.
104. See 1 DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY 57–62
(3d ed. 2011).
105. See id.
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possible. Health insurance covering treatment and rehabilitation is an
example of first-party insurance.106
One obstacle is that first-party insurance, with rare exception,
does not compensate for pain and suffering, disfigurement, and other
items of general damages. A notable exception is the UM coverage
mentioned above.107 This coverage allows the insured to claim against
the insured’s own insurer the full constellation (up to the policy limits)
of damages resulting from a collision with an uninsured or
underinsured motorist who is liable for the damages.108 In the new
world of truly autonomous vehicles, one could imagine a market for
expanding this coverage to include first-party coverage for injuries
caused by AVs when there is no liability on the part of the owner of the
other vehicle. Somewhat like no-fault insurance, injured parties would
look first to their own insurers.109
III. INSURANCE RATES AND POLICIES FOR AVS
Assuming a continuing role for auto insurance in the world of
AVs, it may be useful to look at automobile insurance in general, and
at California in particular, to understand some of the issues that may
arise.
Insurance rates discriminate. All insurers categorize levels of risk
and charge premiums in accordance with their perception of the risk.
Risk usually is a combination of frequency and severity of claims and
other costs associated with a transfer of risk among different classes of
policyholders.110 Virtually all states, including California, prohibit
insurance rates that are “unfairly discriminatory.”111 Discrimination, in

106. Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 48 Cal. 3d 395, 399 n.2 (1989) (“[I]f the
insured is seeking coverage against loss or damage sustained by the insured, the claim is
first party in nature. If the insured is seeking coverage against liability of the insured to
another, the claim is third party in nature.”).
107. See supra Part II.A.
108. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (West 2006).
109. California offers some no-fault options for insurance. As noted above, some of the
coverages in standard automobile policies are first-party, no-fault coverages. See
Progressive W. Ins. Co. v. Yolo Cnty Sup. Court, 135 Cal. App. 4th 263, 268 (Ct. App.
2005); Nager v. Allstate Ins. Co., 83 Cal. App. 4th 284, 289–90 (Ct. App. 2000)
(“Automobile med-pay insurance provides first-party coverage on a no-fault basis for
relatively low policy limits (generally ranging from $5,000 to $10,000) at relatively low
premiums. The coverage is primarily designed to provide an additional source of funds for
medical expenses for injured automobile occupants without all the burdens of a fault-based
payment system.”) (citations omitted).
110. MATTHEW J. HASSETT & DONALD STEWART, PROBABILITY FOR RISK
MANAGEMENT 357 (2009).
111. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.05(a) (West 2011).
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this sense, is not a term intended to apply only to suspect classes—such
as race or religion—but is a term intended to suggest that rates, so far
as practical, reflect relative risks.112
While the words “unfairly discriminatory” may suggest an
element of moral taint, the provenance of the phrase was very practical.
The 1871 Chicago fire and the 1906 California earthquake and fire sent
many insurers into insolvency.113 One cause was aggressive rate
competition in which those with influence and power could demand
rates below their relative risk.114 This either put the insurer’s solvency
at risk, or the inadequate rate charged to some required that an
excessive rate be charged to others. Whether or not one considers this
“unfair,” it also has practical implications. Those who are charged too
much will tend to buy less or not buy insurance at all. Those who are
charged too little will tend to buy more insurance and, possibly, engage
in the insured activity at an inefficient or careless level.115
This, in the industry, is called “adverse selection” or “moral
hazard.” When adverse selection or moral hazard work their mischief,
an insurer or industry may go into a “death spiral”: as more people buy
insurance priced at less than the risk, more people decline to buy
insurance priced at more than the risk,116 and those with insurance
behave more recklessly than they otherwise would. As this happens, it
becomes difficult or impossible for the insurer to make its business a
“zero-sum-game.” Quite apart from considerations of fairness to
policyholders, it becomes increasingly difficult for an insurer to make
up for charging too little for a risk by charging others too much. To the
extent public policy encourages insurance, the policy is undermined
because those charged too much are likely to underinsure or drop out of
the insurance pool altogether.117 In the worst cases, the result may be

112. See Miller, supra note 11, at 276.
113. HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE BETWEEN GLOBAL DYNAMICS AND
LOCAL CONTINGENCIES 31 (J. David Cummins & Bertrand Venard eds., 2007).
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Mark Calabria, Bad for Taxpayers and Whales, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27
2011, 11:34 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/30/who-benefits-fromfederal-flood-aid/federal-flood-aid-bad-for-taxpayers-and-whales (stating under-pricing of
Federal flood insurance program encouraged building in otherwise unsuitable flood plains as
well as inflicted harm on whales).
116. See MICHAEL G. FAURE & TON HARTLIEF, INSURANCE AND EXPANDING
SYSTEMIC RISKS 109 (2003).
117. See id.; Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. 2d 307 (1937). “It is no
longer open to question that the business of insurance is affected with a public interest.
Neither the company nor a policyholder has the inviolate rights that characterize private
contracts. The contract of the policyholder is subject to the reasonable exercise of the state’s
police power.” Id. The California Insurance Code spans 1,271 single-space, size ten-font
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insolvency of the insurer.
A. Rating Factors
Although there are many potential rating factors that insurers may use
to evaluate risk, practicality and politics limit their scope. A rating
factor that is impractical or expensive to administer is not workable.
For example, it may be best to measure an insured’s driving habits by
placing an agent of the insurer as a passenger with the insured for a
week or two. This is not practical, although Progressive Insurance’s
heavily promoted new “Snapshot” policy (an electronic monitor in the
car records the driver’s driving habits) is a high-tech surrogate for the
ride-along agent.118 Other insurers are now offering similar policies.
Territorial rating (usually by zip code) is highly predictive of risk
of loss. Some argue, though, that territorial rating, although neutral on
its face, de facto discriminates against minorities and the poor because
they tend to live in disproportionate numbers in higher risk
neighborhoods.119 The California Commissioner, perhaps acceding to
this concern, permits territorial rating to be used, but at a level of
significance below its true weight.120
Credit scoring presents a similar political tug-o’-war. Although
lively debates surround why one’s credit score actuarially relates to risk
of loss (is there a causation, a mere correlation, or something else?),
insurers claim an actuarially relevant correlation.121 In a time of
economic stress, such as now, there is strong political support for

pages and ends with section 16030. See DIMUGNO & GLAD, CALIFORNIA INSURANCE
LAWS ANNOTATED 76–1347 (2011).
118. Snapshot, PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE, http://www.progressive.com/auto/snapshotdiscount.aspx (last visted Apr. 23, 2012).
119. Gary Williams, “The Wrong Side of the Tracks”: Territorial Rating and the Setting
of Automobile Liability Insurance Rates in California, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 845, 846–
47 (1992). Others disagree. See Miller, supra note 11, at 276.
120. See Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Found. v. Low, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1179, 1187 (Ct.
App. 2000); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, §§ 2632.5, 2632.7, 2632.8 (2008). Prior to 1995
regulations permitted California auto insurers to average the sixteen optional rating factors.
If the average weight was less than the weight given to the number of years of driving
experience (the third-ranked mandatory rating factor), the insurer was in compliance with
Proposition 103 and the pertinent regulations. Commissioner John Garamendi, as one of his
last acts before leaving office, revised the regulation so that each optional factor must be
weighted lower than years of driving experience. Written Testimony of the California Farm
Bureau Federation, In re proposed Amendment of title 10 California Code of Regulations,
Section 2632.8—Optional Automobile Insurance Rating Factors (Mar. 6, 2006) (on file at
Santa Clara University School of Law).
121. James E Monaghan, The Impact of Personal Credit History on Loss Performance in
Personal Lines, CAS. ACT. SOC. E-FORUM, Winter 2000, at 79, 102–03,
http://www.casact.org/pubs/forum/00wforum/00wf079.pdf.
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disallowing credit scoring as a rating factor. Even during more flush
times, the argument that credit scoring disadvantages protected groups
(e.g., racial minorities) enjoys resonance.
Consequently, the
availability of credit scoring as a rating factor is highly contentious.
California’s Commissioner does not allow credit scoring as a rating
factor.122 Texas does allow it.123 In a referendum, Oregon voters
defeated a ballot measure that would have prohibited credit scoring.124
Gender politics also plays a role. It is common knowledge that
young drivers—especially young male drivers—are less safe than more
experienced and mature drivers. Long before automobiles and tourist
busses crowded the streets of Stratford-upon-Avon, Shakespeare
recognized this trait. Referring to young men, Shakespeare wrote: “I
would there were no age between sixteen and three-and-twenty; or that
youth would sleep out the rest; for there is nothing in the between, but
getting wenches with child, wronging the ancientry, stealing,
fighting—Hark you now!” 125
Over their lives, men, women and transgendered individuals also
present different constellations of health care costs. Should insurers be
permitted to use these gender differences as rating factors in setting
health or auto insurance premiums? Ambivalence, or perhaps
schizophrenia, characterizes California’s current approaches to the
issue. California recently passed legislation prohibiting the use of
gender when setting premiums for health policies.126 Gender neutrality
vanishes, however, when rating auto insurance.
Shakespeare’s
common sense observation still enjoys currency—gender is an
approved rating factor for auto insurance.127 Moreover, the California
122. See tit. 10, § 2632.5.
123. See Ojo v. Farmers Grp. Inc., 356 S.W.3d 421, 441–43 (Tex. 2011).
124. Oregon Voters Defeat Credit Scoring Ballot Measure, INS. J. (Nov. 8, 2006),
www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2006/11/08/74099.htm.
125. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, A WINTER’S TALE act III, sc. iii (Henry N. Hudson, ed.,
Boston, Ginn & Co. 1898). Some editions widen the age of foolishness to “ten and threeand-twenty.” See, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, A WINTER’S TALE, act III, sc. iii (. Cross
and T. Brooke, ed., Yale Univ. 1993). Shakespeare should know. He got Anne Hathaway
with child when he was 18 years old and married her in some haste. STEPHEN
GREENBLATT, WILL IN THE WORLD 120–121 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2004).
126. CAL. INS. CODE § 10140.2(a) (West 2006) (“Notwithstanding Section 10140, a
health insurance policy issued, amended, or renewed on or after January 1, 2011, shall not
be subject to premium, price, or charge differentials because of the sex of any contracting
party, potential contracting party, or person reasonably expected to benefit from the policy
as a policyholder, insured, or otherwise.”). Subsection (b) included gender identity within
the definition of “sex.” INS. § 10140.2(b). Regulations to implement gender neutrality for
sexual identity are presently pending before the California Department of Insurance. 40-2
Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg. 1647, Oct. 14, 2011.
127. Tit. 10, § 2632.5(d)(9) (stating optional rating factor Number 9 includes “Gender of
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legislature has the legislative prerogative (subject to federal standards)
to set rating factors for health insurance. They do not enjoy the same
legislative prerogative with respect to automobile insurance rating
factors.128
While one may applaud gender neutrality in insurance rating as an
enlightened step, this may ignore the gravitational pull of market
forces. Unless the insurance is either de jure or de facto required
(qualities enjoyed by automobile insurance and, perhaps, health
insurance), those paying too much are likely to forgo coverage,
minimize coverage, or seek alternatives. The favored group is also
likely to purchase too much because it is a “good deal.” If the
difference in cost or value is palpable, in the fullness of time those
paying too much may fade from the market, and those paying too little,
absent the subsidy flowing to them from those paying too much, will
find themselves in a pool of only those formally favored by the rating
cross-subsidy. This pool, then, will pay the appropriate rates for their
risk, and any benefit from the cross-subsidy, from those who might
have paid too much, should disappear.
Of course, AVs do not have gender or credit ratings. The vehicles
are, however, garaged in disparate zip codes and are driven in localities
and at times (e.g., busy commute hours compared with off-peak hours)
presenting disparate risks. It is even possible that different operating
systems or hardware, like different drivers, may present different risk
profiles. Aging hardware is likely analogous to aging drivers. How all
this will play out, and who will call the plays (legislatures, insurers,
commissioners) will be interesting.
If those injured by driverless vehicles were left with only a claim
against the manufacturer (a “products liability” claim), similar
dislocations may occur. Apart from expense and complexity, opting
for products liability suits as the main avenue for compensating injuries
invites some other adverse consequences. The products liability
insurer is in a poor position to rate the policy based on the relevant
traits of the vehicle driver or owner. Thus, many rating factors, such as
annual miles driven, territory, use, and multiple vehicle discounts,
would be irrelevant or nearly so.129
Since the manufacturer cannot rate the individual purchaser, the
rates passed through to the purchaser will be based on average
the rated driver.”).
128. Found. for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights v. Garamendi, 132 Cal. App. 4th 1354,
1372 (Ct. App. 2005) (stating Commissioner of Insurance, rather than legislature, is
empowered to adopt optional rating factors).
129. A fully autonomous vehicle should eliminate the possibility of human error.
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driver/owner traits over the pool of driver/owners. This may result in
cross-subsidies and adverse selection.
A simple example: the
frequency of accidents is closely related to the number of miles driven.
When setting rates130 an insurance company accounts for the number of
miles driven by the insured and the particular use (e.g., commuting or
pleasure) to which the vehicle is put. A manufacturer would not.
There is a fairly linear relationship between the number of miles driven
and the risk. Assume that $100 per year represents the mileage risk
when a car is driven 1000 miles per year. Let’s assume that $2000
would be the appropriate premium for a car driven 20,000 miles per
year. If the average annual mileage for the manufacturer’s fleet of AVs
is 10,000 miles annually, one would expect the product liability
insurance load for the manufacturer to be approximately $1000 per
year per car multiplied by the average life of the cars. This cost would
be passed on to the purchasers in the up-front price of the car, perhaps
spread over time if financed.
Thus, drivers who drive only 2000 miles would be charged too
much, and drivers who drive 20,000 miles would be charged too little.
Consequently, drivers of AVs, like diners at an all-you-can-eat
restaurant, would be inclined to drive too much (“Moral Hazard”).131
Low mileage drivers, who are charged too much, would also more
likely select ordinary cars over AVs because ordinary cars are more
accurately rated and, therefore, less expensive to operate. Those
driving more than average would more likely select AVs because they
are charged too little (“Adverse Selection”). This also undermines
whatever benefits flow from the new Pay-As-You-Drive policies.
Likewise, a driver who instructs the car to drive conservatively
(assuming the future holds such possibilities) would pay the same
insurance as one who instructs the car to drive more aggressively (e.g.,
entering a command to change into a faster lane whenever possible).
Both examples would encourage overuse or possibly misuse of the
product.
As current rating factors for self-driving vehicles lose
relevance,132 the manufacturer’s inability to reflect these rating factors
in the price is also irrelevant. Moreover, the statutes and regulations
applying to automobile policies under Proposition 103 simply do not
130. See Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Found. v. Low, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1179, 1184 (Ct.
App. 2000).
131. One might argue that the high mileage driver may replace the car more frequently,
thus paying an additional “premium” with the more frequent purchases.
132. For example, driving safety record, years of driving experience, academic standing,
non-smoker, to name a few.
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apply to the commercial general liability, products liability, or multirisk policies that suppliers and manufacturers purchase to cover risks
from their products. These are not automobile policies within the
definition of Proposition 103 and California Insurance Code section
660(a). Indeed, suppliers and manufacturers, unlike automobile
owners, are free to forgo insurance altogether.
B. Examples of Difficulty in Setting Rates for New Technologies
1.

Airbags

One may cite two examples where the move from testing to real
life experience diverged. When airbags were first introduced, they
were estimated to save 9000 lives per year.133 However, between 1987
and 2001 airbags saved 8369 lives and caused approximately 291
deaths between 1990 and July 2008.134 Thus, an insurer basing its rates
on the estimated efficacy of air bags would have missed the mark.
Even with the benefit of hindsight, however, past is not necessarily
prologue. During this same period airbags consistently improved.
On/Off switches were added, the deployment force was reduced,
sensors were added to adjust to an occupant’s weight and seat position,
and air bags were no longer marketed as a substitute for seatbelts.135
One can anticipate that the technology enabling AVs, much like
today’s computers, will rapidly advance in such a way that predictions
from prior experience may be very poor predictors of future loss trends.
2.

ABS Brakes

The second example is ABS brakes.136 When first introduced,
many assumed that they would reduce accident costs. For a brief
period after their introduction, however, accidents actually increased.137
The increase was due to the unfamiliarity with the operation and feel of
133. NIDHI KALRA ET AL., LIABILITY AND REGULATION OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE
TECHNOLOGIES 38 (2009), http://www.dot.ca.gov/research/researchreports/reports/2009/prr2009-28_liability_reg_&_auto_vehicle_final_report_2009.pdf; Paul Eisenstein, Airbags
Arrive, Muffling an Almost 20 Year Debate, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 3, 1989),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1989-09-03/travel/8901100288_1_air-bags-equippednew-cars.
134. KALRA ET AL., supra note 134, at 39.
135. Id.
136. The system prevents wheels from locking during braking, thus maximising traction
and helping the vehicle avoid going into a skid. Questions and Answers Regarding Antilock
Brake Sytem (ABS), NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ASSOC., http://www.nhtsa.gov/
cars/problems/equipment/absbrakes.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2012).
137. Anti-Lock Brakes, HIGHWAY SAFETY RES. AND COMM., http://www.iihs.org/
research/qanda/antilock.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2012).
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ABS brakes.138 Many drivers, when they sensed the judder of the
brakes as they adjusted to the insipient skid of a wheel, assumed the
brakes were not working properly and pumped the brakes or otherwise
reacted in a way that reduced their effectiveness.139 Other drivers may
have been encouraged to drive more aggressively in reliance on the
new ABS systems.140
C. Proposition 103 and AVs
Proposition 103 applies to rates and premiums for automobile
policies “as described in subdivision (a) of Section 660” of the
California Insurance Code.141 Section 660(a) defines “policy” as any:
[A]utomobile liability, automobile physical damage, or automobile
collisions policy, or any combination thereof . . . insuring a single
individual or individuals residing in the same household [if the
automobile is] a motor vehicle of the private passenger or station
wagon type that is not used as a public or livery conveyance for
142
passengers, nor rented to others.

Thus, as presently drafted, the provisions of Proposition 103 will
govern the insuring of AVs owned by individuals.
The Commissioner of Insurance must approve all rating factors.143
While the Commissioner has discretion to approve and rank some
rating factors, so long as they “have a substantial relationship to the
risk of loss”144 (referred to as the “optional rating factors”), Proposition
103 requires that the three most important rating factors determining

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Self-Driving Cars: Safer at Any Speed?, THE ECONOMIST (March 3, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/node/21548992.
141. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.02(a) (West 2011). To the extent insurers were to offer and
policyholders were to purchase first-party coverage to insure themselves against, for
example, pain and suffering, Cal. Insurance Code section 660 may or may not include that
kind of policy within its ambit. The question would turn on whether the policy would be
one for “automobile liability coverage.” Section 660(b) provides “‘automobile liability
coverage’ includes only coverage of bodily injury and property damage liability, medical
payments, and uninsured motorists coverage.” CAL. INS. CODE § 660(b) (West 2011)
(emphasis added). One could argue that a first-party policy covering the policyholder’s
general damages, such as pain and suffering, was not a “liability” policy. On the other hand,
the policy creates a “liability” on the part of the insurer, therefore it may be a policy with
“coverage of bodily injury . . . liability.” Id. Since the definition of “automobile liability
coverage” includes “medical payments,” and the MedPay provisions of a policy do not
require liability on the part of anyone other than the insurer, this definition is at least
plausible. Id.
142. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 660(a)–(a)(1).
143. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.02(a)(4).
144. Id.
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rates and premiums (referred to as the “mandatory rating factors”) must
be, in the following order: (1) the insured’s driving safety record, (2)
the number of miles he or she drives annually, and (3) the number of
years of driving experience the insured has had.145
This order of ranking, however, does not necessarily reflect the
relative weight of each factor. Thus, to comply with Proposition 103’s
mandated ranking, insurers must artificially increase or decrease the
actual predictive value placed on these (and other) rating factors to
preserve this hierarchy.146 This is called “pumping” when the value of
a rating factor is increased to move it up in the hierarchy and
“tempering” when the value of a stronger rating factor is artificially
decreased in order to move it down in the rating order.147 For example,
annual miles driven may better predict risk of loss than driving safety
record. Driving safety record, however, must be the most important
rating factor.148 In order to comply with Proposition 103 an insurer
must “temper” the importance of the annual mileage and/or “pump” the
importance of the driving safety record in order to comply with the
order mandated by Proposition 103.149 Pumping, tempering, or
combining the two, is an example of how the auto rating factor
regulations allow or even compel arbitrary rate setting. Two insurers
with identical sets of costs and facts can arrive at different rates
depending on how each approaches the pumping/tempering “fix.”
Pumping and tempering applies both to the three mandatory rating
factors and to some optional rating factors. For example, territory
(where a car is garaged or driven) may be more predictive than any, or
indeed all, of the three mandatory rating factors. Nevertheless, it must
be tempered, or the three mandatory rating factors must be pumped, in
order to keep territory ranked below the three mandatory rating
factors.150 Indeed, current regulations require insurers to weigh
territory below both the mandatory rating factors and any optional
rating factors the insurer uses.151

145. Id.; see CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2632.5(c)(2)(C) (2008) (listing approved auto
rating factors).
146. Tit. 10, § 2632.8(d); see Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Found. v. Low, 85 Cal. App.
4th 1179, 1190–91 (Ct. App. 2000).
147. The process of pumping and tempering is discussed in Spanish Speaking Citizens’
Found., 85 Cal. App. 4th at 1229–37.
148. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.02(a).
149. Id.
150. See tit. 10, § 2632.7.
151. Tit. 10, § 2632.7(b)(4) (“[T]he order of analysis of the optional factors shall be
determined by the insurer, with the exception that frequency band and severity band [these
are referred to as the territorial rating factors] shall be analyzed last.”).
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Tempering the territorial rating factor below its true value may
well cause a wealth transfer from insureds who garage their cars in low
risk territories to insureds who garage their cars in higher risk areas.
This means, for example, that rural drivers may pay more for insurance
than their risk justifies. Urban drivers, subsidized by the overpayments
of rural drivers, pay less. If one looks at mandatory auto insurance as
somewhat akin to a tax, this presents the prospect of a regressive tax—
rural insureds, while paying more than their risk suggests, are generally
less affluent than urban insureds.152 Likewise, pumping years of
driving experience above more predictive optional rating factors
means, quite simply, that the age of drivers counts too much. Put
another way, risks presented by differences in years of driving
experience must be exaggerated. Since risk increases with younger
drivers and also increases with older drivers, these two groups must
pay higher premiums than is justified by the risk they present. Thus, in
both of these examples it may be argued that, rather than protecting
consumers in general, some consumer groups “win,” and others “lose.”
Whether this cross-subsidy is good policy is a political judgment made
by Proposition 103 and by the Commissioner of Insurance when
implementing both Proposition 103 and the optional rating factors that
fall within the Commissioner’s aegis.
When these cross-subsidies become palpable, it can result in
adverse selection. An insured who is charged too little for annual
mileage because the mileage rating factor has been tempered below its
predictive value is likely to drive more miles than he or she would
have, if charged the higher rate. The result is similar when annual
miles driven cannot, as a practical matter, be used by the products
liability insurers of suppliers and manufacturers. Additionally,
insureds who are charged more than their risk warrants are also more
likely to underinsure or drop out of the pool altogether. The recently
approved Pay-as-You-Drive policies are an attempt to address this
issue with respect to the annual miles driven factor.
D. Some Mandatory Rating Factors Do Not Work with AVs
Proposition 103’s mandatory rating factors simply do not fit the
brave new world of AVs. The most important factor, “driving safety
record,” is singularly inapt when the car is driverless.153 Indeed, one
152. Written Testimony of the California Farm Bureau Federation, In re proposed
Amendment of title 10 California Code of Regulations, Section 2632.8—Optional
Automobile Insurance Rating Factors, March 6, 2006) (on file at Santa Clara University
School of Law).
153. See id.; John Markoff, Google Cars Drive Themselves, in Traffic, N.Y. TIMES
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might expect or encourage a driver with a poor record to opt for a
driverless car. Nevertheless, Proposition 103 requires the insured’s
driving safety record to rank as the top-rating factor. Since driving
record was singled out in the “Declarations” portion of the Proposition,
even a two-thirds vote of the legislature to amend it may not “further”
the Proposition’s purposes.154
The second rating factor, the “number of miles he or she drives
annually,” does appear to directly bear on the risk of AVs.155 There is a
possible statutory interpretation issue with the reference to “he or she
drives.” It may be argued that it is the car that is driving, not “he or
she.” The proposed Nevada regulations referenced above provide that
the “operator” (the one who engaged the AV) is “deemed the driver.”156
The third ranking mandatory factor, the “number of years of
driving experience the insured has had,” again seems almost
completely inapposite.157 When the driver is merely a passenger, the
person’s driving experience has little or no relevance to risk. Indeed,
one may imagine youngsters who could not get a driver’s license, and
older people who should long ago have surrendered their keys, being
ferried about in fully autonomous vehicles.
Proposition 103 also forbids rates that are “unfairly
discriminatory.”158 Perhaps the most commonly accepted definition of
unfairly discriminatory in the context of insurance is: “An insurance
rate structure will be considered to be unfairly discriminatory . . . if
allowing for practical limitations, there are premium differences that
do not correspond to expected losses and average expenses or if there
are expected average cost differences that are not reflected in premium
differences.”159 Applying this definition, one could easily argue that
(Oct. 9, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/science/10google.html?scp=1&sq=
autonomous%20vehicles&st=cse (“The technology is ahead of the law in many areas.”).
154. Section 1 of Proposition 103 declares, among its purposes, “Second, automobile
insurance rates shall be determined primarily by a driver's safety record and mileage
driven.”
Text of Proposition 103, CONSUMER WATCHDOG (Jan. 1, 2008),
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/feature/text-proposition-103.
155. Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Found. v. Low, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1179, 1184 (Ct. App.
2000).
156. NEV. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, LCB File No. R084-11, PROPOSED
REGULATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, available at
http://www.dmvnv.com/public_meetings/R084-11.pdf.
157. Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Found., 85 Cal. App. 4th at 1184.
158. See id. at 1224.
159. C. Arthur Williams, Price Discrimination in Property and Liability Insurance, in
INSURANCE, GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIAL POLICY 209–42 (1969) (emphasis added).
Principle four of the CAS Actuarial Statement of Principles for Ratemaking states: “A rate is
reasonable and not excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory if it is an actuarially
sound estimate of the expected value of all future costs associated with an individual risk
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pumping and tempering rates is unfairly discriminatory. If the process
is mandated by Proposition 103, the same Proposition that forbids
unfairly discriminatory rates, it would seem that unfair discrimination
may be both legal and mandated in California.
The most sensible approach to this dilemma, at least with respect
to AVs, would be to abolish or substantially re-order the three
mandatory rating factors. However, this is more easily said than done.
As noted above, amending Proposition 103 requires a two-thirds vote
of the legislature.160 Moreover, section 8(b) of the Proposition
provides: “The provisions of this act shall not be amended by the
Legislature except to further its purposes.”161
Both of these
requirements can be formidable hurdles.
Persistency discounts serve as an example. Most are aware that
their insurer discounts their rates if they have been with the insurer for
a period of time.162 This is called the “persistency discount.” The
discount is usually justified on the basis that persistency saves the
insurer the producing expenses associated with finding a new insured.
If one wants to change insurers, Proposition 103 does not permit the
subsequent insurer to match the persistency discount offered by the
insured’s current insurer.163 Thus, the second insurer could not
compete by offering the same discount. Changing insurers, then, was
somewhat like a taxable event. The “tax” is the loss of the persistency
discount when purchasing the new policy.
The California legislature concluded that this both undermined
competition and drove up the cost of insurance by discouraging the
ability to shop for lower rates. The legislature made the following
findings:
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that it furthers the
purpose of Proposition 103 to encourage competition among
carriers so that coverage overall will be priced competitively. The
Legislature further finds and declares that competition is furthered
when insureds are able to claim a discount for regular purchases of

transfer.” CAS. ACTUARIAL SOC., STATEMENT OF PRINCIPALS REGARDING PROPERTY AND
CAUSALTY INSURANCE RULEMAKING 6 (1988), http://www.casact.org/standards/princip/
sppcrate.pdf.
160. See Found. for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights v. Garamendi, 132 Cal. App. 4th
1354, 1359 n.1 (Ct. App. 2005).
161. Id. at 1364.
162. See California Court Strikes Down Persistence Discount Law, INS. J. (Sept. 30,
2005), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2005/09/30/60326.htm.
163. See id. (2003 California law that permitted insureds to switch insurance companies
and maintain their persistency discount was struck down as not furthering the purposes of
Proposition 103).
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insurance from any carrier offering this discount irrespective of
whether or not the insured has previously purchased from a given
164
carrier offering the discount.

Despite these legislative findings, the Court of Appeal held the
amendment invalid because, in the Court’s view, it did not further the
purposes of Proposition 103.165 The Court also held that Proposition
103 vests only the Insurance Commissioner with the power to set
optional rating factors.166 Thus, the legislature, even by a super
majority, may not be authorized to adopt rating factors for auto
insurance. Following this defeat in the courts, promoters of “portable
persistency” qualified a ballot initiative to amend this aspect of
Proposition 103. With a vote of 51.9% to 48.1%, the initiative failed in
the June 8, 2010 election.167
Some statutory interpretation might avoid much of this
discrimination. The NAIC, every state, and Proposition 103 all require
that rates may not be “unfairly discriminatory.” Proposition 103 also
requires that the three mandatory rating factors—driving record, annual
mileage, and years of driving experience—be applied “in decreasing
order of importance.” The Proposition expressly forbids unfairly
discriminatory rates, but it does not define “order of importance” or
expressly require or authorize the pumping and tempering of
mandatory and optional rating factors. Another reading more closely
allied with the universal policy forbidding unfairly discriminatory rates
might be to interpret the Proposition to require only that the mandatory
164. See Found. for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights, 132 Cal. App. 4th at 1362 n.6.
165. Id. at 1362. The court also noted that “[t]wo prior attempts by the Legislature to
amend Proposition 103 have been invalidated by the courts because they did not ‘further
[the] purposes’ of the initiative, as section 8, subdivision (b) requires.” Id. at 1366 (citing
Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 11 Cal. 4th 1243, 1265 (1995) (stating purposes of Prop.
103 not furthered by exempting surety insurance)); Proposition 103 Enforcement Project v.
Quackenbush, 64 Cal. App. 4th 1473, 1494 (Ct. App. 1998) (stating purposes of Prop. 103
not furthered by reducing insurers' obligation to refund excess premiums)).
166. Id. at 1372 (“Under Proposition 103, therefore, it is the Insurance Commissioner
rather than the Legislature that is vested with ratemaking authority subject to the appropriate
ratemaking process.”); CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.02(a)(4) (West 2011) (“Rates and premium
for an automobile insurance policy . . . shall be determined by application of the following
factors [listing the 3 mandatory factors] [and] [t]hose other factors that the commissioner
may adopt by regulation . . . .”) (emphasis added).
167. Prop 17 Auto Insurance, U.C. BERKELEY, http://igs.berkeley.edu/library/research/
quickhelp/elections/2010primary/prop17.php (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). Proposition 17
appeared on the June 8, 2010 ballot. A similar proposition has been filed with the California
Attorney General’s office (Initiative 11-0013) and may appear on the November, 2012
ballot. See CHANGES LAW TO ALLOW AUTO INSURANCE COMPNAIES TO SET PRICES BASED
ON A DRIVER’S HISTORY OF INSURANCE COVERAGE. INITIATIVE STATUTE (INITIATIVE 110013, AMENDMENT #1-S (Aug. 11, 2011), http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/initiatives/
pdfs/i944_title_and_summary_11-0013_final.pdf (last visited May 15, 2012).
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factors be given the maximum weight that the underlying data
supports. No court has yet adopted this approach, but AVs may be the
reductio ad absurdum that prompts rethinking the issue. To count the
insured’s driving record and the years of driving experience as two of
the three most important rating factors when, in fact, they are irrelevant
when rating a self-driven automobile would be, one may modestly
suggest, absurd.
Under Proposition 103 as currently interpreted, there may be one
or two other rather poor options. The Commissioner can adopt a fourth
optional rating factor for AVs.168 The type of car being insured is
presently among the current optional rating factors.169 Even if AVs are
substantially safer than other vehicles, this rating factor must still rank
behind driving safety record, miles driven annually, and number of
years of driving experience.170 Under such a rating scenario, there
would be little motive for a driver with a poor driving record to opt for
the safer AV. The insured’s rates would still be based on the rates that
would apply were the insured to drive an ordinary vehicle.
Time is a great leveler. As bad drivers operate AVs, their driving
records will improve. There should be no citations and no principally
at fault accidents. In three years’ time one would expect the driving
record to approach perfection—along with all other AV drivers. This
simply illustrates again why the insured’s driving record is irrelevant as
a rating factor. No driver is any better or any worse than any other
driver. Yet, this irrelevant rating factor must be weighted more than
other far more relevant factors, such as miles driven, the type of
vehicle, and territory. This also illustrates that the rating factors related
to the type and capacity of the vehicle, rating factors that now dwell in
the tempered company of other optional rating factors, should be
allowed to rise to the position they deserve.
Adding AVs to the pool of insured cars may also increase the
weight of the territorial rating factor. Although current regulations
require that territory must rank last among all rating factors, as some of
those factors fall away, the weight of the territorial factor may well
rise. Rather than ranking fifteenth and sixteenth among optional rating
factors, territory may rise to fifth or sixth place.
There is a second possible compromise that may help, and it
168. INS. § 1861.02(a)(4) (“Those other factors that the commissioner may adopt by
regulation and that have a substantial relationship to the risk of loss.”).
169. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2632.5(d)(1) (2008).
170. Tit. 10, § 2632.5(d)(1) (stating the type of vehicle); tit. 10, § 2632.5(d)(8) (stating
the vehicle characteristics, including engine size, safety and protective devices,
damageability, reparability, and theft deterrent devices).
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requires neither legislation nor a new proposition. Prior to the 2006
amendments to the regulations governing the rating factors, all of the
optional rating factors could be averaged together.171 If their average
weight, when compared to the third mandatory rating factor—years of
driving experience—was less than the weight of years of driving
experience, then the insurer’s class plan was in compliance with the
Proposition. This method was challenged. Recognizing broad
discretion in the Commissioner to adopt rating factors in compliance
with Proposition 103, the Court of Appeal upheld this approach.172 As
his last regulatory act before leaving office, then Commissioner John
Garamendi scrapped this system and introduced the current system in
which each optional factor must weigh less than the third mandatory
factor. Subsequent Commissioners have not sought to revisit this issue.
AVs may catalyze some rethinking along this line.
E. The Good Driver Discount
Assuming that application of the mandatory rating factors is a
problem not so intractable that it cannot be solved, a California insurer
would also face dealing with the Good Driver Discount (GDD).
Proposition 103 mandates that all insurers offer a GDD “to every
person who meets the criteria.”173 The regulations adopted pursuant to
Proposition 103 speak in terms of “driver.”174 Those who qualify are
entitled to a rate “at least 20% below the rate the insured would
otherwise have been charged.”175 Except for some serious offences,
such as drunk driving, the basic outline is this:
• A moving violation, which has not been masked by going to
driving school, receives one point.
• An accident for which the driver is “principally at fault” that
resulted in only damage to property exceeding $1,000 receives
176
one point.
• If principally at fault and the accident resulted in bodily injury,
177
the driver receives two points.

171. Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Found. v. Low, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1179, 1190 (Ct. App.
2000); Wells, supra note 16.
172. Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Found., 85 Cal. App. 4th at 1185–86.
173. INS. §§ 1861.02(b)(1), 1861.025.
174. Tit. 10, §§ 2632.13; 2632.13.1.
175. INS. § 1861.02(b)(2); The California Code of Regulations section 2632.12(a)
interprets this mandate, changing it to “20 percent less than the lowest rate available to a
comparable driver who is not a good driver.” Tit. 10, § 2632.12(a). (emphasis added).
176. INS. § 1861.025(b)(1)(A).
177. Results under these two provisions can seem quite arbitrary. One who breaks a
headlight on a premium car may well do more than $1000 in damage, while the same driver
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• If a driver receives two points within a three-year period, the
insurer may withdraw the GDD. The driver then loses the GDD
178
for at least three years.

Class plans also include, as they must, a separate rating factor for
driving safety record (the first mandatory rating factor), and a driving
record that counts against the GDD also counts against the driving
safety record rating factor.179 Thus, a driver may lose both the GDD
and the discount based on driving record. Since driving safety record
must be the most important rating factor, the loss of both will often
cause a fifty percent or more rise in premiums.
The Commissioner of Insurance is instructed by the Proposition to
adopt regulations setting guidelines to be used to determine fault for
the purposes of the GDD.180 The Commissioner has adopted extensive
regulatory guidelines.181
Very early in the life of Proposition 103 the Commissioner
adopted a definition of “principally at fault” that presents some
anomalies. Proposition 103 does not define “principally,” but the
Commissioner adopted a definition which, at least in theory, allows
only one driver in a multi-vehicle accident to be principally at fault.182
The regulation provides that: “An insurer shall not make a
determination that a driver is principally at-fault for an accident unless
the driver’s actions or omissions were at least 51 percent of the legal
cause of the accident . . . .”183
Put another way, one may remain a good driver for the purposes
of the GDD discount if one is “lucky” enough to have another driver
equally or more at fault. Four drivers, all of whom run a four-way
stop, are all good drivers for this purpose (each is only twenty-five
percent the legal cause of the accident). Two drivers going thirty miles
per hour over the limit are both good drivers if they contribute equally
to the damages. Drivers insured by different insurers, however, could
who totals an older and less expensive car may do less than $1000 in damage (the salvage
value of the car). In addition, the statute and regulations offer no definition of “bodily
injury.” See INS. § 1861.025(b)(1)(A); tit. 10, § 2632.12(a). A pregnant woman in a minor
accident may reasonably incur several thousand dollars in medical bills simply to find that
she is quite well. Another person may expend ten dollars on anti-inflammatory drugs
because the person’s back was uncomfortable for a week. Is either, or neither, “bodily
injury?”
178. Tit. 10, § 2632.13.1.
179. Note that, by regulation, only principally-at-fault accidents may be counted against
the driving safety record rating factor. See tit. 10, § 2632.13.
180. INS. § 1861.025(b)(3).
181. Tit. 10, §§ 2632.12, 2632.13, 2632.13.1.
182. See tit. 10, § 2632.13.1.
183. Tit. 10, §§ 2632.13(b), 2632.13.1.
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both be found to be principally at fault because the insurers need not
coordinate their findings. By contrast, only one could be found
principally at fault if both happen to be insured by the same company.
The regulations also provide a number of rebuttable presumptions
that, in certain accident scenarios, the driver is not principally at fault.
For example, the driver is rebuttably presumed not to be principally at
fault if “the vehicle was struck in the rear by another vehicle, and the
driver has not been convicted of a moving traffic violation in
connection with the accident,”184 or “the driver was not convicted of a
moving traffic violation and the operator of another vehicle involved in
the accident was convicted of a moving traffic violation.”185
Applying the GDD to AVs will present some difficulties and some
anomalies. The current definition of principally at fault speaks only in
terms of causation.186 Perhaps fault is implied, but the regulation, at
least for accidents in California, does not explicitly require fault, nor, if
fault is implied, does the regulation suggest how culpability is to be
weighed along with causation.
If the regulation requires fault on the part of the driver, then it is
difficult to see how it is to be applied to cars that are not driven by a
driver. Even if the principally at fault determination is to be based only
on causation, it is difficult to see how “the driver’s actions or
omissions” satisfied the “at least 51 percent” standard.187 Moreover,
some of the rebuttable presumptions arise only if the “driver” or “the
operator of another vehicle” has not been convicted of a moving traffic
violation related to the accident.188 If the car has no driver or operator,
however substantial the contribution to the accident, the AV or its
owner will not be principally at fault. Also, if one is to consider fault,
then in a collision with an AV any ordinary driver who shares any level
of fault may be principally at fault because the ordinary driver is the
only driver who shares any fault. Thus, the GDD must be extended to
the AV regardless of the automobile’s actual risk. Put another way, all
operators of AVs would be entitled to an insurance rate twenty percent
less than the insurer would otherwise charge.
Since insurance is a zero-sum-game, and an insurer would not stay
in business long if it charged all of its policyholders twenty percent less
than it should charge, the difference must be made up elsewhere. At
184. Tit. 10, § 2632.139(c)(2) (emphasis added).
185. Tit. 10, § 2632.13(c)(3) (emphasis added).
186. Tit. 10, § 2632.13(b) (emphasis added) (“At least 51 percent of the legal cause of
the accident.”).
187. Id.
188. Tit. 10, § 2632.13(c)(3).
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present, it is made up from those who do not qualify as good drivers. If
all vehicles were autonomous, and all AV “drivers” were good drivers,
then the system would crash. There would simply be no one to make
up the twenty percent in lost premium. As the number of AVs
increases and the pool of “not good” drivers shrinks, the financial
burden on not good drivers could be ruinous. Imagine the premium for
the driver who has two points in the previous three years and owns the
last ordinary car in California. The premium would be tens of millions
of dollars. Moreover, the insurer does not have the option to make up
the difference from other rating groups, such as vehicle type, gender, or
territory, because to do so would likely raise the weight of those groups
above the mandatory rating factors.
In order to keep insurance viable and to avoid some of the
enormous spikes in premiums for “not good drivers,”189 insurers and
the Department adopted regulatory language which may be at odds
with the Proposition’s language. California’s regulatory language
bases the GDD rate on the rate for “a comparable driver who is not a
good driver”190 rather than the rate “the insured would otherwise have
been charged.”
This gloss on the statute causes dramatic changes. Its virtue is
that the changes are less dramatic than applying the Proposition’s
language. Some simple illustrations follow. 191
Example #1
Assume a group of 100 good drivers and 10 not good drivers.
Assume in all other respects they are equal.192 Assume, also, that the
premium to cover the good drivers would be $100 each, and assume
the premium to cover the not good drivers would be $110 each. This
pool of insureds would generate the need for a total premium of (100 x
$100) + (10 x $110) = $11,100. Applying the Proposition’s language,

189. This awkward phrase is apt because it is the language of the regulation and because
those who are “not good” drivers are not necessarily “bad” drivers.
190. Compare CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.02(b) (West 2011) (“[A]t least 20% below the
rate the insured would otherwise have been charged”) with tit. 10, § 2632.12(a) (“20 percent
less than the lowest rate available to a comparable driver who is not a good driver.”)
(emphasis added).
191. For similar examples of computing rates in the context of the persistency rating
factor, see Found. for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights v. Garamendi, 132 Cal. App. 4th 1354,
1367 (Ct. App. 2005).
192. Of course, all things would not be equal. Some self-driving cars may be safer than
others. Some will be more expensive to repair than others. Some will be garaged in
neighborhoods less safe than others. None of these factors, however, alters the point of the
hypothetical.
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the good drivers should be offered a rate of $80 rather than $100. This
would generate $8000 in total premium. Since the pool must generate
$11,100 in premium, the difference ($3100) must be made up by the
not good drivers. Since there are only ten of them, each not good
driver’s premium would go from $110 to $310 (i.e., the $3,100
shortfall divided by the ten remaining drivers who must share it.)
Example #2
The phrase “would otherwise have been charged” is not selfdefining, so one may approach the calculation differently. Apply the
same assumptions about the pool and premium as above. If we do not
know anything about individual drivers, then the premium each driver
would otherwise be charged is $11,100 divided by 110, or $100.90
each. One could argue that $100.90 is what the policyholder “would
otherwise have been charged.” Discounting this by 20% yields a good
driver rate of $80.72 per policy. This will bring in a total premium
from the 100 good drivers of $8072. The balance ($11,100 – $8072 =
$3028) must be collected from the remaining ten not good drivers.
This puts the not good driver’s premium at $302.80 each (divide $3028
by 10 for the ten not good drivers). The total collected equals the
$11,100 necessary to support this book of business.
Example #3
One can see in this last example that under the Proposition’s
language the greater the number of not good drivers in the relevant
pool, the higher the rates for the good drivers and the lower the rates
for the not good drivers. Assume, for example, that the pool consisted
of 100 not good drivers and only 10 good drivers. The insurer must
collect a total of $12,000 to cover this book of business. Doing the
same calculations as in Example #2 the good drivers would pay $87.27
per policy and the not good drivers would pay $111.29 (try your hand
at the arithmetic). This is a small increase for the 10 good drivers (an
increase from $80.72 to $87.27), but a large benefit for the 100 not
good drivers (a decrease from $302.80 to $111.29).
Example #4
Applying the regulation, the insurer must offer the good drivers a
premium that is “at least 20 percent less than the lowest rate available
to a comparable driver who is not a good driver.” To accomplish this,
the insurer must first solve for the not good driver rate, and then offer
the good drivers .80 of that rate. Assume the same numbers as in
Example #1. Again, the total premium must equal $11,100. Where x
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is the not good driver rate, the formula is: 10x + 100(.80x) = $11,100.
X (the not good driver rate) is $123.33. The good driver rate must,
then, be equal to or less than .80 x $123.33 = $98.66. This is a very
large difference between what the Proposition suggests and what the
regulation effects. The good driver’s rate rises from $80 to $98.66
(only $3.34 below what they, arguably, “would otherwise have been
charged”), while the not good driver’s rate falls from over $300 to the
more palatable $123.33. Indeed, since the GDD is a twenty percent
discount from the rate for not good drivers, the GDD becomes illusory
if the rate for a not good driver exceeds the base rate by twenty percent
or more.
Example #5
If the proportion of not good drivers in the relevant pool increases,
the rates for both good drivers and not good drivers begin to fall.
Reverse the relative number of good and not good drivers to 10 good
drivers and 100 not good drivers. The rate for not good drivers falls to
$111.11 and the rate for good drivers drops to $88.88. Again, try your
hand at the arithmetic. 193
The results in Examples #4 and #5 show that the method of
calculating the good driver discount is unfairly discriminatory. The
rates bear little relationship to “the expected value of all future costs
associated with an individual risk transfer.”194 Even if one could
articulate a principled basis for reducing good drivers’ rates to twenty
percent less than they otherwise would be charged, there is no
principled basis for allowing the rates for good and not good drivers,
which we know should be $100 and $110 respectively, substantially to
vary merely because of the mix of good and not good drivers in the
insurance company’s pool. The proportion of good and not good
drivers is a matter entirely beyond the insured’s control and has no
bearing on the insured’s individual risk.
However one calculates the GDD, inserting into the pool large
numbers of AVs entitled to the twenty percent discount will have
important, and possibly unanticipated, consequences. Since AVs
should generate fewer liabilities for automobile insurers (both because
they are safer and because possibly a significant number of the
remaining losses may leapfrog over the automobile insurer directly to
the supplier or manufacturer), adding them to the pool will lower

193. 100x + 10(.80x) = $12,000. X, the not good driver’s rate, equals $111.11. Eighty
percent of the not good driver’s rate equals $88.88.
194. CAS. ACTUARIAL SOC., supra note 160.
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overall automobile rates.
Example #6
Assume the same 110 car pool from above, but change the mix to:
Good drivers –95
Good drivers in AVs-5
Not Good drivers-9
Not Good drivers in AVs-1

Per unit cost—100
Per unit cost—50
Per unit cost—110
Per unit cost—50

Total cost
Total cost
Total cost
Total cost

9,500
250
990
50

Total premium needed to service this group—$10,790
Since this is less than the $11,100 in Example #1, it stands to
reason that individual premiums will be lower. The average cost, or
base rate, is $98.09 ($10,790/110). Now calculate the GDD using the
same formula as above: 10x + 100(.80x) = $10,790. The not good
driver premium is $119.80 and the good driver premium (.80 x
$119.89) is $95.91. Both are lower than the premium calculated above
using the regulation.
The five good drivers driving AVs and the one not good driver
driving an AV, however, are paying far too much. Based on their risk,
each should pay $50. The not good AV driver’s premium is $119.89
and the good AV driver’s premium is $95.91.
To make this fairer, one must create a rating class for AV drivers.
If they could be hived off from the other drivers, this would be easy.
Each would pay $50. Since these are “automobile liability” policies
within the meaning of Calif. Ins. Code section 660(a), and since section
660(a) is incorporated by Proposition 103,195 they must be rated with
all other policies. Consequently, the GDD must be extended to them,
and the mandatory rating factors must also be applied to them. As a
consequence, AV drivers in general will pay too much, and AV drivers
with poor driving records will pay much too much.
F. Putting It All Together
To calculate the premium for the AVs, the insurer must first
calculate the GDD. Again, assuming the group above and applying the
regulations, the result is $95.91 for the “good” AV driver and $119.89
for the “not good” AV driver.

195. INS. § 1861.02(a) (“Rates and premiums for an automobile insurance policy, as
described in subdivision (a) of Section 660, shall be determined by application of the
following factors in decreasing order of importance . . . .”).
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The next step might be to create a rating plan for the class of AV
drivers. This, however, is not permitted by Proposition 103. The
insurer must first apply, in descending order of importance, the three
mandatory rating factors imposed by Proposition 103. Let us focus
only on the first one—Driving Safety Record. Since the AV is selfdriven, the driving safety record should be irrelevant, as illustrated by
the assumed $50 unit cost for both good and not good drivers of AVs in
our hypothetical. Nevertheless, driving safety record must be the most
important of all the rating factors.
The calculations are shown in Appendix A.196 In order to comply
with Proposition 103 and the accompanying regulations, the “weight”
attributed to driving safety record must be greater than the “weight”
attributed to the fact that the car is an AV. The weight attributed to
driving safety record (remember, there are some bad drivers in ordinary
cars among the group) is 3.96. The weight attributable to AVs is 5.35.
This rate plan would be out of compliance; therefore, the insurer must
either “pump” the driving safety record-rating factor by artificially
expanding its relativities or “temper” the AV rating factor by
artificially compressing its relativities, or both. When one rating factor
is pumped, then another must be tempered in order that the total
premium collected equals the $10,790 original total premium covering
all losses and related costs.
Appendix A shows the calculations assuming tempering (col. 9) or
pumping (col. 10). The tempered weight for AVs in col. (18) is a
fraction below (at the 14th decimal place!) the 3.96 weight for driving
record in col. (8), so it is now in compliance. In neither case does the
AV insured pay the appropriate amount. In one case the good AV
driver pays $60.44 and the not good AV driver pays $75.55—both well
over the $50 represented by their risk. The excess premium returns to
the pool and subsidizes non-AV drivers. In the pumping example, the
five good AV drivers pay $47.63 (only a discount of $2.37 below the
$50 risk) and the one not good AV driver pays $63.17 ($13.17 too
much). A small subsidy of $1.32 [$13.17 – 5($2.37)] flows back to the
premium pool to subsidize other drivers. Note, too, that the good AV
driver’s premium is, as it must be, equal to or less than eighty percent

196. The author is extremely grateful to Shawna Ackerman for her invaluable assistance
in developing this example. Ms. Ackerman is an actuary who has worked for the California
Department of Insurance, for Pinnacle Actuarial Resources, Inc., and now works for the
California Earthquake Authority. An electronic copy of this paper can be found at
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/337/.
The formulae for the calculations are
imbedded in the Excel spread sheet noted in the Appendix to this Article and can be
manipulated by the user after the Appendix is downloaded.
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of the not good AV driver’s premium, even though both present the
same unit cost ($50 per car) and in one example, the good AV driver,
even with the GDD, pays $10.44 more than the $50 unit cost of the
risk.
Keep in mind that this calculation relates only to the driving
record rating factor. At its highest permissible weight, the rating of
AVs must weigh less than the third rating factor (years of driving
experience—likely of little relevance for self-driving cars), thus
pushing it even further from its true weight. Therefore, the best
position AVs can enjoy in this ratings race is fourth place.
One may argue that raising the premium for a not good driver of a
self-driving car makes as much sense as raising the price of bus or train
tickets for not good drivers. Awarding a GDD that results in a
premium of $10.44 more than the risk makes little sense. It is difficult
to imagine any social policy supporting this discrimination.
Perhaps there is a way out of this dilemma. One might argue that
an owner of an AV is not a “person who qualifies” under the
Proposition because the GDD is a discount earned by good driving.
Perhaps it is arguable that a person who does not drive is not a
“driver,” therefore cannot be a “good driver.” This interpretation,
though sensible, would require some stretching of the Proposition’s
language and would probably invite a court challenge.
Commercial insurers of manufacturers and suppliers are not
encumbered with Proposition 103’s unique automobile provisions,197
therefore they need not offer a GDD, nor need they conform to the
ranking of the mandatory rating factors. To the extent that the risks of
AVs are transferred to them, the insurance burden passed to consumers
in the price of the car can reflect the actual, and presumably lower, risk
presented by AVs. As noted above, however, for practical reasons
some rating factors, such as annual miles driven and territory, cannot
properly be reflected in the automobile price. Moving from the
awkward and arbitrary results mandated by Proposition 103’s rating
factors to a commercial insurance setting that cannot properly reflect
some other rating factors is also an awkward trade-off. At best, it may
be a choice of the least worst.198

197. The automobile provisions of Proposition 103 only apply to automobile liability,
physical damage or collisions policies. INS. § 1861.02(a); CAL. INS. CODE § 660(a) (West
2011). Since the automobile provisions of Proposition 103 do not apply to commercial
policies, manufacturers need not pump, temper or offer a good driver discount.
198. As King Lear lamented when forced to choose, so he thought, between evil
daughter Goneril and very evil daughter Regan, “Not being the worst stands in some rank of
praise.” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR art II, sc. iv (W. Cross and T. Brooke, ed.,
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Another viable solution might to be to amend the California
Insurance Code section 660(a) to exclude from the definition of
“policy” those policies covering liability for AVs (at least when
operated in autonomous mode). Since Proposition 103 incorporates
section 660(a), this would likely require a two-thirds vote of the
legislature and the amendment would have to “further the purposes” of
Proposition 103. Assuming a two-thirds vote could be mustered, the
issue would then be whether the amendment furthers the purposes of
the Proposition. To the extent that liability moves from fault-based
driving to defect-based products liability, the purposes underlying the
mandatory rating factors and the GDD simply cannot be accomplished.
Manufacturers will pass these costs through to automobile buyers free
of the Proposition’s restraints. Since the purposes of the Proposition, at
least with respect to liability coverage,199 simply cannot be
accomplished when dealing with self-driving cars, amending section
660(a) would not frustrate the purposes of Proposition 103.
“Furthering” may be different from “not frustrating,” but avoiding
forcing Proposition 103 into a mold that does not fit its purposes could
be viewed as furthering its purposes. It is also unlikely that the voters
considered insurance rules governing automobiles that, at the time they
adopted Proposition 103, existed only in fantasy. If the Department of
Insurance were to sponsor the legislation, one might expect the
sponsorship to be afforded some level of deference.200
Jurisdictions not governed by Proposition 103 would find it
relatively easy to deal with this advancing technology. Proposition
103, and the difficulties faced with amending it, may leave California
at a decided disadvantage when it comes to coping with this developing
technology.
IV. ADJUSTING RATES TO REFLECT RAPIDLY IMPROVING
TECHNOLOGY
Technology improves at an astounding rate. Gordon Moore, a
past president of Intel, famously (and thus far accurately) predicted that
transistor count on microprocessors would grow exponentially—

Yale Univ. 1993).
199. There still may be some role for comprehensive, collision and MedPay coverage, at
least to the extent that these offer coverages unattached to any fault on the part of the
insured or defect on the part of the insured automobile.
200. See Found. for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights v. Garamendi, 132 Cal. App. 4th
1354, 1373 (Ct. App. 2005) (“Great weight should be given to an agency's construction of a
rule or regulation it enforces.”).
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doubling every two years.201 This has become known as “Moore’s
Law.” His colleague at Intel, David House, predicted that this would
cause computer performance to double every eighteen months.202
Perhaps this should be known as “House’s Corollary.” Whether or not
these predictions directly bear on AVs, one can expect rapid
developments in the technology controlling them. Thus, the risks they
present may dramatically change with the latest download, update or
patch. So, too, the appropriate rate for the risk should change—likely
downward. Proposition 103 makes it difficult to produce timely rates
that are reasonably responsive to changes in loss exposures.
Automobile manufacturers and sellers may adjust their prices
according to the market. Proposition 103, however, provides, in effect,
that those who sell automobile insurance must charge the full sticker
price.203 Proposition 103 also provides that “[e]very insurer which
desires to change any rate shall file a complete rate application with the
commissioner.”204 While this may, on its face, seem a neutral
provision, its practical impact is contrary to the interests of consumers.
Like other businesses, insurance is somewhat cyclical. There are “hard
markets” in which supply is restricted and one might expect rates to
rise. There are “soft markets” where insurance is more available or
demand is lower, thus one might expect rates to fall. This provision, as
currently interpreted, applies even when an insurer wants to lower
rates. Lower rates, of course, benefit consumers.
While voters who adopted Proposition 103 may well have had in
mind keeping rates at the lowest rate at which an insurer will be willing
to bring a product to the market, it seems unlikely that the voters
intended to increase impediments to lowering rates—at least not when
lowering rates would not threaten the solvency of the insurer.
Filing a “complete rate application with the commissioner” is a
substantial impediment to reducing rates. A complete rate application
is an expensive, ponderous and time-consuming process. A typical
filing may take three to five months before approval. Some

201. Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits, 38
PROC. OF THE IEEE 1, available at ftp://download.intel.com/museum/Moores_Law/ArticlesPress_Releases/Gordon_Moore_1965_Article.pdf. The increase in the number of transistors
on a microprocessor looks roughly like this: 1971—2300, 1985—275,000, 2000—42
million, 2004—592 million, 2011—3 billion. Steven Johnson, More & More of Moore’s
Law, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 5, 2011, at C1.
202. INTEL, VIDEO TRANSCRIPT: EXCERPT FROM A CONVERSATION WITH GORDON
MOORE: MOORE’S LAW (2005), ftp://download.intel.com/museum/Moores_Law/VideoTranscripts/Excepts_A_Conversation_with_Gordon_Moore.pdf.
203. See MacKay v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1427, 1440–41 (Ct. App. 2010).
204. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.05(b) (West 2011) (emphasis added).

299202-TEXT.NATIVE.1338842133..DOC

2012]

NEW TECHNOLOGY—OLD LAW

6/4/2012 1:36 PM

145

applications have even been delayed for a year.205 In 2009, when
insurers filed many new rate plans in order to comply with the new
territorial rating regulations, delays among the top twenty private
passenger auto insurers ranged from a low of 54 days (Viking) to a
high of 558 days (USAA and USAA Casualty). Many took over 300
days (e.g., State Farm Mutual, Farmers Insurance Exchange,
Progressive Choice).206 If the desire to lower rates is in response to a
“soft market,” by the time the lower rate has been approved, the market
may have significantly altered. Thus, it removes, to the detriment of
consumers, one motive to lower rates in a soft market. In addition,
once an application to lower rates is filed, the Commissioner, consumer
groups, and others can intervene and ask that the rates be lowered even
further.207 Thus, an application to lower a rate by six percent may
invite pressure to lower it even further.208 If they “substantially
contributed, as a whole” to the decision, a consumer group can also bill
the insurance company for its legal, advocacy, and witness fees.209
Unless otherwise required by the Commissioner of Insurance, an
insurer may normally expect a rate, once approved, to remain valid for
three years.210 Given the disincentives to lowering rates outlined
above, one may expect that an insurer who wants to lower its rates to
compete for greater market share in a softening market may temporize
until otherwise required to make a new rate application.211 This is

205. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE (July 28, 2009), http://insurance.
ca.gov/.
206. Id.
207. INS. § 1861.05(c).
208. For example, GEICO General filed to lower rates by 9.70%. On July 5, 2007, the
Department approved a rate reduction of 14.50%, - 4.80% lower than requested. This is not
to suggest that the lower rate is not justified, but just to illustrate that applications to lower
rates come with some risk to the insurer. There are numerous other examples on the
Department’s web site. State Farm Mutual filed to lower its rates by 3.20%, but the
approved rate on April 5, 2009 was -8.00%—a difference of -4.80%. Infinity Insurance
filed to lower rates by 2.79%, but the approved rate on 7/22/09 was -10.44%—a difference
of -7.65%. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, supra note 205.
209. INS. § 1861.10(b).
The commissioner or a court shall award reasonable advocacy and witness fees
and expenses to any person who demonstrates that (1) the person represents the
interests of consumers, and, (2) that he or she has made a substantial contribution
to the adoption of any order, regulation or decision by the commissioner or a
court. Where such advocacy occurs in response to a rate application, the award
shall be paid by the applicant.
Id.; see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2661.1(k) (2008).
210. Tit. 10, § 2644.50. Many insurers, however, file rate plans more frequently.
Yearly filings are not uncommon.
211. Indeed, it may be that some of the longer rate processing times noted above may
have been in part a result of temporizing by insurers who, during the process, were applying
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especially so because, even if the insurer successfully completes a rate
application to lower its rates, if market conditions harden during this
three year period, there is no assurance, without going through the
entire process again, that the insurer can return its rates to the
previously approved rates.
Experience elsewhere suggests that this disincentive to lowering
rates, with respect to personal automobile insurance, is unnecessary.
Relying primarily on competition to regulate automobile rates, there
are numerous file-and-use or use-and-file states. These all allow
insurer’s to lower rates (or raise them for that matter) without prior
approval—usually subject to the regulator’s ability to disapprove a rate
based on inadequacy, excessiveness, or unfair discrimination.212 Even
among the states that generally apply “prior approval” to private auto,
many permit insurers to lower rates below the approved rate.213 This is
usually accomplished by moving the process from prior approval to
either file-and-use or use-and-file if the change (often up or down) falls
within a prescribed percentage. The percentage ranges from a high of
25% (Kentucky) to 10% (Alabama, Pennsylvania), 7% (South Carolina
and possibly New Jersey), 5% (New York) and “less than 5%” (North
Dakota).214
There does not appear to be any indication that facilitating the
lowering of rates has impaired the solvency of insurers.215 The benefits
of lower rates to consumers are obvious. States that show a concern for
solvency modulate the impact by designating a range between five and
ten percent.216 Others simply rely on the regulator’s ability to

what they thought were favorable rates.
212. For examples see Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia (rate decreases for auto), Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky (if
rate change is not over twenty-five percent in last twelve months), Louisiana, Maryland,
Maine, Mississippi, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey (only if
decrease is revenue neutral), New Mexico, New York (for rate decreases only), North
Dakota (if less than five percent), Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania (decreases of ten
percent or less), Rhode Island (unless decrease exceeds five percent), South Carolina (up to
seven percent below company’s existing rate), South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, and Wisconsin. Regulation Modernization, supra note 34.
213. See id.
214. For examples see Alabama (ten percent or less), Georgia (rate decreases for all
lines except large commercial risks), Kentucky (decreases of more than twenty-five percent
within twelve months), New Jersey (increases of seven percent, unclear about decreases),
New York (as of 2010, flex rating up or down within five percent band in any twelve month
period), North Dakota (if less than five percent), Pennsylvania (decreases of ten percent or
less), and South Carolina (decrease of up to seven percent). The essential elements of
various state regulations are listed online. See id.
215. See id.
216. See CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.05 (West 2011).
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disapprove a filed or used rate. California consumers would benefit
from a similar approach.
While insurers must charge the rate approved by the
Commissioner, that a “rate” has been approved should be no
impediment to charging a lower rate. It seems reasonable that a rate of
$100 includes the lower rate of $95.217 Thus, insurers should be
allowed to flex down without doing violence to the words or purpose of
Proposition 103. New York, a prior approval state, is probably the
most recent state to move in this direction. Effective January 2010,
auto insurers may flex up or down within a five percent band in any
twelve-month period without seeking prior approval.218
Ability to lower rates will be even more important as the safety of
AVs evolves. Predicting loss trends for one, two or three years into the
future is difficult at best. Marketing insurance is much like trading in
futures. Money is collected now against a promise to deliver a service
later at an unknown cost. The analogy may be even more apt than
appears. Following the oil crisis of 1979–1980 claims frequency
dropped. Drivers were not driving more safely; they were simply
driving less because fuel prices had spiked.219 Where rapidly
advancing technology pushes down the risk presented by AVs, the
regulatory environment should be nimble enough to allow consumers
to benefit with equal promptness.
As in other states, solvency concerns can be addressed by
bounding the flex range within reasonable limits. Proposition 103
provides that the commissioner must hold a hearing if requested to do
so and a rate adjustment for auto insurance exceeds seven percent.220
This number seems a fair average for those many states that allow flex
down (and usually up) without prior approval. If claims experience for
AVs were to drop dramatically within the time frame in which an
insurer might reasonably be expected to file a new rate plan, seven
percent may prove too conservative a parameter.
There may be some concern that an insurer might flex down in an
unfairly discriminatory way. This concern, if valid, may be addressed
by requiring the insurer to flex down equally across all classes within

217. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3536 (2011) (“The greater contains the less.”).
218. See Regulation Modernization, supra note 34.
219. LeRoy Boison, Will Post-Katrina Gas Shortages Impact Auto Claim Frequencies?
PINNACLE ACTUARIES, Dec. 2005, at 1, available at http://www.pinnacleactuaries.com/
Files/Publications/mon-PinnacleMonograph2005GasShortages.pdf.
220. INS. § 1861.05(c) (“[T]he proposed rate adjustment exceeds 7% of the then
applicable rate for personal lines or 15% for commercial lines, in which case the
commissioner must hold a hearing upon a timely request.”).
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the class plan. If improvements among the pool of AVs lower claims
experience, lowering rates across the board is an awkward
compromise. Unless rates may be lowered only for AVs, all insureds,
whether driving AVs or more dangerous automobiles, will benefit from
the lower rates attributed to improvements brought to the pool only by
AVs. It should also be kept in mind that the Commissioner has the
power to halt any rate change by holding a hearing on the
Commissioner’s own motion.221 Virtually every state forbids rates that
are unfairly discriminatory, but this has not been an impediment to
states with the flexibility noted above.
In order to credit savings to the AV owners who have earned
them, it might be helpful to think of an AV that has been upgraded with
a download as a vehicle different from the one that was originally
rated. If a policyholder changes automobiles mid-term, or changes the
use of an automobile (e.g., a change from commuting to pleasure), the
insurer immediately adjusts the policyholder’s rates. The adjustment,
however, will be to a rate already pre-approved in the insurer’s class
plan. If, however, an insured purchases a new model that did not exist
at the time of the previous rate filing, the insurer need not submit a new
rate filing to rate the car. The new model is simply accounted for in the
next rate filing. It may be helpful, then, to think of each significant
upgrade to self-driving cars as analogous to a new model.
Anticipating rapid advances based on experience and technology,
it might also be possible to pre-approve rate adjustments based on
verifiable improvements. To insure the integrity of the suggested rate
changes, perhaps some independent certification of the efficacy of the
change might be required. The National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA), Department of Transportation (DOT), or
some other body may be an appropriate certifier.
Even if cost savings are clearly attributable to improvements in
AVs, crediting them to AV policyholders may be difficult for another
reason. Again, the mandatory rating factors impose their restraints. If
rates fall for the “type of vehicle” rating factor, the factor’s weight
may, then, exceed the weight of the third mandatory factor—years of
driving experience. The insurer would, then, be out of compliance.
As noted above, to the extent the liability and insurance burden
passes to manufacturers and their insurers, rates may be adjusted
outside the restraints of Proposition 103. Because the liability and/or
insurance costs were passed on to the buyer in the cost of the car, it
would be difficult to pass savings onto current owners after the sale
221. Id.
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was completed. Only new buyers would benefit from insurance
savings attributable to more recent technological improvements.
It may be that the Commissioner could adopt a definition of “rate”
that is broad enough or flexible enough to accommodate this new
technology. Alternatively, the Commissioner could sponsor legislation
to authorize “flex down.” If the legislation were viewed as a
modification of Proposition 103, it would require the two-thirds super
majority noted above. It is at least arguable that lowering rates in a
non-discriminatory way and consistent with maintaining solvency
furthers the purposes of the Proposition.
CONCLUSION
California is the cradle of technological innovation.
Not
surprisingly, Google, one of the primary developers of AVs, is located
in California.
California is not the cradle of insurance innovation. Despite
Woody Allen’s 1973 film, Sleeper, the drafters of Proposition 103, and
the voters convinced to follow their lead, embedded in California a
regulatory system ill-suited to insuring self-driving automobiles that
are controlled by new and fast developing technology.222
Unless ways can be found to conform Proposition 103 to this new
reality, insurance for AVs is likely to migrate to a statutory and
regulatory environment untrammeled by Proposition 103—commercial
policies carried by manufacturers and suppliers. This migration
presents its own set of problems. While the safety of AVs could be
more fairly rated, other important rating factors, such as annual miles
driven and territory, must be compromised. Whether this migration
occurs will also depend on how liability rules do or do not adjust to a
world in which people will nevertheless suffer injuries from AVs, but
in which it is unlikely our present fault rules will adequately address
compensation.
If concepts of non-delegable duty, agency, or strict liability attach
initial liability to owners of faulty cars with faultless drivers, the
insurance burden will first be filtered through automobile insurance
governed by Proposition 103. These insurers will then pass the losses
up the distribution line to the insurers of suppliers and manufacturers
that are not governed by Proposition 103. Manufacturers and suppliers
will then pass the insurance cost back to AV owners in the cost of the
vehicle. The insurance load reflected in the price of the car will pass
through to automobile owners free of any of the restrictions imposed
222. See SLEEPER, supra note 6.
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by Proposition 103. There will be no GDD, such as it is, no mandatory
rating factors, and, depending on where the suppliers’ or
manufacturers’ insurers are located, more flexible rating. One may
ask: What is gained by this merry-go-round?
When addressing the insurance challenges of AVs, perhaps the
regulatory system needs someone with the vision of the late Steve Jobs.
In the age of the MacBook Pro, developers of AVs may find
themselves working in a legal and regulatory environment (the
Operating System, if you will) somewhat akin to the 1985 Mac.

299202-TEXT.NATIVE.1338842133..DOC

2012]

NEW TECHNOLOGY—OLD LAW

6/4/2012 1:36 PM

151

299202-TEXT.NATIVE.1338842133..DOC

152

6/4/2012 1:36 PM

[Vol. 52

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

APPENDIX A
Example with Self-Driving Cars (SDC)223

223. See
spreadsheet.

http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/337/

to

access
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